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Post by Laurent de Gouvion on Jan 15, 2017 14:04:12 GMT
A question: if Ney and Grouchy switched places in the Waterloo Campaign, would Napoleon have won? Grouchy was a better tactician than Ney (Ney lost Quatre-Bras while Grouchy won Wavre) and Ney would probably march to the sound of guns (he had a record of ermm.. independent will? Jena is an example). Not necessarily. Sure, Ney lost Quatre Bras, but this was against a general who had earned a reputation of being a great defensive tactician. Ney's service in the Peninsular War made him justifiably wary of any seeming weakness in the British lines- these points generally being heavily manned with hidden skirmishers or artillery. Ney did well to fight the Iron Duke to a draw, but a victory would have likely seen Wellington retire to Waterloo at even greater speed, changing nothing. Similarly, Wavre was a consolation battle. Grouchy had hitherto only commanded cavalry (although he was one of France's finest cavalrymen) and had already shown his skill by not marching to the sound of the guns. His orders were to interpose himself between Wellington and Blucher, not specifically to take Wavre. While probably not treasonous, Grouchy's conduct did not inspire faith in his abilities- his own subordinates (I remember Vandamme among them) pleaded with him to let them march on Waterloo, but he would have none of it. This was the same error Bernadotte made at Auerstadt in 1806, but fortunately for him Davout was able to carry the day on his own. Regarding Ney's impetuosity, I would point out Bautzen, where Ney was too slow to seal the deal. However, regardless of his faults, Ney was still a talented commander, especially when Napoleon was at hand to guide him. Ney was indeed a talented commander. He had defeated the Iron Duke before during Massena's withdrawal from the Lines of Torres Vedras. However, I wasn't talking about Wellesley during Quatre Bras. I was talking about the Prince of Orange, which had almost no experience and performed quite poorly in the campaign. Ney could have tried a pre-dawn attack, when the Prince hadn't arrived and the defenders were effectively leaderless. Even later, Ney would have caught the Prince by surprise and would have had plenty of time to press the attack (considering there were a gap of 8 hours between the arrival of the Prince and the beginning of the battle). Nonetheless, the most fatal mistake was made when Ney recalled D'Erlon, making Napoleon lose a corps that could have blocked the Prussian rear and cause heavy damage to the Prussians. That being said, Ney was (in my opinion) completely justified to recall D'Erlon. He was under Ney's command and Ney had just been ordered by Napoleon to take Quatre Bras and support him at Ligny, which he was unable to do without D'Erlon. The blame to me lies on the French staff, being unable to paint a clear picture with the order. Despite the faults mentioned, Ney still did quite well in Quatre Bras. He swiftly took Gemioncourt, Piraumont, and the south of Bossu Wood. Most importantly, he held Wellesley from supporting Blücher at Ligny. (I would add more later. This thread was inactive for a long time, so I was a bit surprised when you replied.) |
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Post by pathdoc on Jan 15, 2017 16:07:15 GMT
A question: if Ney and Grouchy switched places in the Waterloo Campaign, would Napoleon have won? Grouchy was a better tactician than Ney (Ney lost Quatre-Bras while Grouchy won Wavre) and Ney would probably march to the sound of guns (he had a record of ermm.. independent will? Jena is an example). Not necessarily. Sure, Ney lost Quatre Bras, but this was against a general who had earned a reputation of being a great defensive tactician. Ney's service in the Peninsular War made him justifiably wary of any seeming weakness in the British lines- these points generally being heavily manned with hidden skirmishers or artillery. Ney did well to fight the Iron Duke to a draw, but a victory would have likely seen Wellington retire to Waterloo at even greater speed, changing nothing. Similarly, Wavre was a consolation battle. Grouchy had hitherto only commanded cavalry (although he was one of France's finest cavalrymen) and had already shown his skill by not marching to the sound of the guns. His orders were to interpose himself between Wellington and Blucher, not specifically to take Wavre. While probably not treasonous, Grouchy's conduct did not inspire faith in his abilities- his own subordinates (I remember Vandamme among them) pleaded with him to let them march on Waterloo, but he would have none of it. This was the same error Bernadotte made at Auerstadt in 1806, but fortunately for him Davout was able to carry the day on his own. Regarding Ney's impetuosity, I would point out Bautzen, where Ney was too slow to seal the deal. However, regardless of his faults, Ney was still a talented commander, especially when Napoleon was at hand to guide him. Was it an error, or was it Bernadotte being the slimy, evasive, never-there-but-always-had-a-legitimate-excuse creature R. F. Delderfield suggests he was in The March of the Twenty-Six? |
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Post by junius on Jan 15, 2017 18:30:53 GMT
Not necessarily. Sure, Ney lost Quatre Bras, but this was against a general who had earned a reputation of being a great defensive tactician. Ney's service in the Peninsular War made him justifiably wary of any seeming weakness in the British lines- these points generally being heavily manned with hidden skirmishers or artillery. Ney did well to fight the Iron Duke to a draw, but a victory would have likely seen Wellington retire to Waterloo at even greater speed, changing nothing. Similarly, Wavre was a consolation battle. Grouchy had hitherto only commanded cavalry (although he was one of France's finest cavalrymen) and had already shown his skill by not marching to the sound of the guns. His orders were to interpose himself between Wellington and Blucher, not specifically to take Wavre. While probably not treasonous, Grouchy's conduct did not inspire faith in his abilities- his own subordinates (I remember Vandamme among them) pleaded with him to let them march on Waterloo, but he would have none of it. This was the same error Bernadotte made at Auerstadt in 1806, but fortunately for him Davout was able to carry the day on his own. Regarding Ney's impetuosity, I would point out Bautzen, where Ney was too slow to seal the deal. However, regardless of his faults, Ney was still a talented commander, especially when Napoleon was at hand to guide him. Was it an error, or was it Bernadotte being the slimy, evasive, never-there-but-always-had-a-legitimate-excuse creature R. F. Delderfield suggests he was in The March of the Twenty-Six? My man! |
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Post by junius on Jan 15, 2017 18:36:52 GMT
Not necessarily. Sure, Ney lost Quatre Bras, but this was against a general who had earned a reputation of being a great defensive tactician. Ney's service in the Peninsular War made him justifiably wary of any seeming weakness in the British lines- these points generally being heavily manned with hidden skirmishers or artillery. Ney did well to fight the Iron Duke to a draw, but a victory would have likely seen Wellington retire to Waterloo at even greater speed, changing nothing. Similarly, Wavre was a consolation battle. Grouchy had hitherto only commanded cavalry (although he was one of France's finest cavalrymen) and had already shown his skill by not marching to the sound of the guns. His orders were to interpose himself between Wellington and Blucher, not specifically to take Wavre. While probably not treasonous, Grouchy's conduct did not inspire faith in his abilities- his own subordinates (I remember Vandamme among them) pleaded with him to let them march on Waterloo, but he would have none of it. This was the same error Bernadotte made at Auerstadt in 1806, but fortunately for him Davout was able to carry the day on his own. Regarding Ney's impetuosity, I would point out Bautzen, where Ney was too slow to seal the deal. However, regardless of his faults, Ney was still a talented commander, especially when Napoleon was at hand to guide him. Ney was indeed a talented commander. He had defeated the Iron Duke before during Massena's withdrawal from the Lines of Torres Vedras. However, I wasn't talking about Wellesley during Quatre Bras. I was talking about the Prince of Orange, which had almost no experience and performed quite poorly in the campaign. Ney could have tried a pre-dawn attack, when the Prince hadn't arrived and the defenders were effectively leaderless. Even later, Ney would have caught the Prince by surprise and would have had plenty of time to press the attack (considering there were a gap of 8 hours between the arrival of the Prince and the beginning of the battle). Nonetheless, the most fatal mistake was made when Ney recalled D'Erlon, making Napoleon lose a corps that could have blocked the Prussian rear and cause heavy damage to the Prussians. That being said, Ney was (in my opinion) completely justified to recall D'Erlon. He was under Ney's command and Ney had just been ordered by Napoleon to take Quatre Bras and support him at Ligny, which he was unable to do without D'Erlon. The blame to me lies on the French staff, being unable to paint a clear picture with the order. Despite the faults mentioned, Ney still did quite well in Quatre Bras. He swiftly took Gemioncourt, Piraumont, and the south of Bossu Wood. Most importantly, he held Wellesley from supporting Blücher at Ligny. (I would add more later. This thread was inactive for a long time, so I was a bit surprised when you replied.) The Prince of Orange actually saved the day at Quatre Bras iirc. Wellington was initially slow to react; Orange not only held firm, but clamoured frantically for reinforcements, allowing Wellington a decent position when he arrived. Sure, the Iron Duke'Street mere reputation played a huge role, but Orange deserves credit too. I agree with you about D'Erlon. Boney had every right to order him to Ligny, Ney had every right to order him to Quatre Bras. Blame lies either with the staff or D'Erlon himself (French commanders were expected to act on their own initiative, and he was anyway almost in position for the action at Ligny), and don't forget that Soult hadn't held a staff job in more two decades, that too as a junior officer. |
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