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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 12, 2021 17:36:29 GMT
2.7.Conclusion
In the very first days of the war Soviet fronts suffered from a great strike – Western front almost entirely defeated, Northwestern in a haste retreat, Southwestern lost majority of its armor. Large part of their aviation was destroyed (estimated 1200 destroyed planes already on 22nd of June). In the first days directives called to defeat the enemy and counterattack across the state border, but now Red Army just hoped to hold the 1939-border. Germans were stronger than expected. But even they were surprised after these few days of fighting. Wolfgang Werthen from the 16th tank division (16 PzD) wrote: “The first 10 days of this campaign are over. After 10 days in France, German tanks, chasing cowardly [not my words! – alexandrvasilevski] French and Englishmen, advanced 800 km and stood on the Atlantic shores. In the first 10 days of the “Eastern campaign”, we advanced just 100 km [in Ukraine] and Tank Groups of German troops fought against a strong and technically well-equipped enemy, who often used unknown tactical methods.” While Germans wondered, whether they will be able to overcome enemy’s stiff resistance, USSR did everything to make this resistance more effective. On 23rd of June, Stavka of High Command of the Armed Forces (since now just Stavka in this presentation) was organized under S. Timoshenko’s chairmanship (on 10th of July Stalin himself will take this post). Other Stavka members were G. Zhukov, V. Molotov, S. Budyonniy, K. Voroshilov and N. Kuznetsov, later B. Shaposhnikov. On 30th of June, Politburo formed the State Defense Comitee (Государственный комитет обороны, ГКО, GKO). GKO was a centralized agency, which ruled the whole Soviet economy and could force any factory, plant, collective farm, any citizen to fulfill its decisions. This structure proved to be extraordinarily successful during wartime. In fact USSR began its “total war” already in 1941, 2 years before Germans. And so this war began – with immediate success for the Germans, but USSR resisting well and preparing for the biggest defense of motherland in the history of mankind.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 26, 2021 12:24:08 GMT
Part 3. Battle of Smolensk and the halted blitzkrieg (11.07. – 09.09.41) 3.1. Finland and Army “Norway”: slow but steadily
German Army “Norway” fought anything else but a blitzkrieg, which is understandable for a unit advancing through rough terrain on a secondary direction. Its advance on Murmansk was stopped in July by Soviet landings in the German rear (2 200 men landed in 3 waves). But on 8th of September Germans resumed their offensive. Finnish advance in Central Karelia was also stopped by the end of summer. On 31st of July Finnish Southeastern Army began an offensive against Leningrad. On 4th of September it stopped in front of the Karelian (Siestroretsk) fortified district and thus blocked Leningrad’s northern land supply route.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 26, 2021 13:37:25 GMT
3.2. Northwestern direction: Blockade begins
After capturing Pskov, AG “North” ordered 4 PzG to split its forces in two – 41 MC should advance on Luga-Leningrad direction and also block Narva isthmus – the only land route of retreat for the Soviet 8 A in Estonia; 56 MC was ordered to cut Leningrad-Moscow railway and form the outer ring of Leningrad’s encirclement. This decision didn’t give 4 PzG and AG “North” a chance to reach any of their objectives in the nearest time (don’t know why does ET like Leeb so much, because here you clearly see his lack of strategic mind). On 12th of July, 56 MC began an offensive on Novgorod. On 14th of July, its 8 PzD occupied Soltsy, on the halfway to Novgorod, but its flanks were overextended. Soviet troops used this opportunity and began on the same day a counterattack against 8 PzD’s flanks. On the next day 8 PzD became the first encircled Wehrmacht division in WW2. However Soviet forces couldn’t form a tight cauldron and the encircled Germans escaped, though with heavy casualties. Soltsy counterstrike became a real Soviet victory, which forced Manstein to abandon his offensive on Novgorod. Meanwhile 41 MC captured bridgeheads over Luga river in Ivanovskoe and Sabsk. Soviet command prepared Luga defensive line since the beginning of the month and didn’t want to give it up, especially as it was very close to Leningrad. 2nd militia division (дивизия народного ополчения, ДНО, DNO) and Leningrad infantry school immediately began strong counterattacks to eliminate the bridgeheads. This task wasn’t achieved, but both German tank divisions, the 6th and the 1st, suffered heavy losses. 36 MD further west moved on Gdov and Narva. On 19th of July, Hitler ordered 4 PzG to stop until 18 A will catch up with tanks and neutralize Soviet troops in Estonia. There Soviet 8 A effectively counterattacked near Pärnu and Tartu. 18 A could resume its offensive only on 22nd of July. After 2 days of fighting it pressed Soviet 11 RC (rifle corps) to Peipus (Chud) lake and almost entirely destroyed it. On 7th of August 18 A reached the Gulf of Finland in Kunda. But although Soviet forces in Estonia were now cut off, they didn’t evacuate via sea route. The reason for such a risky decision was Soviet bombing campaign against Berlin. It could be led only from Moonsund archipelago in Estonia. These bombings were an initiative of N.G. Kuznetsov, Soviet Navy commander, to regain the Navy’s prestige in political leadership’s eyes. First raid (7th of August) caught Germans by surprise, it was just on 24th of July that Goering stated that not a single bomb will fall on Reich’s capital; Soviet planes didn’t suffer any casualties during that raid. Next bombings were less successful (17 planes shot down in total). However the damage to Berlin’s industry was close to zero and the operation only raised Soviet morale. Therefore evacuation of Tallinn (Estonian capital) began only on 27th of August, when Germans already shelled its harbor. Baltic Fleet brought more than 30 000 sailors, soldiers and civilians on ships. Their way to Kronstadt lay through hell – Germans built a strong mine-artillery position on Yuminda point, their aviation could bomb Soviet ships with impunity, because Soviet only big airfields in this region were near Leningrad – too far away from Tallinn. USSR lost 62 ships of its 225. Some 10 000 men, women and children died, but not many survived the war from those, who escaped from Tallinn – they mostly died during Leningrad blockade. Already on 8th of August, Germans began breaching Luga defensive line from their bridgeheads, but at first they advanced very slowly. Northern Front command worried that 41 MC will turn north to cut off Soviet troops on the Baltic sea coast, which wasn’t true – it advanced directly on Leningrad. The defense on Leningrad direction was pretty weak and if Germans brought 56 MC there they could’ve captured Leningrad already in August. But at the same time Vatutin (Chief of Staff of Northwestern Front) launched a strong counterstrike at Staraya Russa and Manstein’s corps was transferred to stop it. To the north of Ilmen lake German offensive went on. On 16-19th of August, 1 army corps (AC) occupied Novgorod, on 26th Hoepner’s tankers closed Luga cauldron with 55 000 encircled Soviets. Due to dense forests in the region many of them escaped from encirclement to join the defense of Leningrad, estimated more than quarter. On 8th of September, 20 MD captured Schliesselburg, completing land blockade of Leningrad. Will the city survive a siege? Maps:
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 26, 2021 17:51:47 GMT
3.3. Western direction: Battle of Smolensk
Already on 3rd of July, 2 and 3 PzG were under 4th Army’s command (Günther von Kluge) – this new unit was called 4th Tank Army. Kluge’s Army soon became orders to encircle and destroy Soviet armies on Dnieper-Dvina line. Wehrmacht command believed that this line was the last one, on which Soviets would provide organized resistance west of Moscow. And at first, things looked very well for Germans. 3 PzG was divided in two – 57 MC led an impressive drive on Nevel, which forced well-defending Soviet 22 A to abandon Polotsk fortified district and connected AGs’ “North” and “Center” flanks; 39 MC saw an even bigger success, capturing Yartsevo in the rear of 19th, 20th and 16th Soviet armies on 16th of July, which together with Guderian’s drive on Yelnya and Smolensk, threatened them with an encirclement. Speaking about Guderian, his troops failed to occupy Mogilёv, but successfully bypassed and encircled this town on 14th of July. The heroic defense of Mogilёv will however last until 26th of July. Further north 46 MC captured Yelnya, where it immediately began suffering from strong counterattacks and 47 MC reached Smolensk and tried to link up with Hoth’s PzG and close the pocket. Nevertheless Soviet High Command tried to slow down the Germans with its own offensive actions. In one of those counterstrikes Soviet troops used legendary rocket artillery pieces BM-13 (“Katyushas”) for the first time in the history of warfare near Orsha on 14th of July. “Katyushas” inflicted heavy casualties and a morale blow on Germans, but it was not near Orsha where Soviets really succeeded in executing a counterstrike, but near Bobruisk. There F.I. Kuznetsov’s 21 A (main attack by 63 RC) crossed Dnieper and advanced several dozen kilometers until being stopped by 53 AC. On 21st of July, 22 A on the northern flank of “Smolensk bulge” also achieved some success, retaking Velikie Luki and letting some of its encircled units escape the cauldron. But by that time the main focus was on another, bigger cauldron – Smolensk pocket with 300 000 Soviet soldiers in it. Germans didn’t achieve a tight encirclement – 16th, 19th and 20th armies held connection with other units through Soloviёvo and Ratchino crossings over Dnieper. Timoshenko formed so-called “operative groups”, which counterattacked German flanks from outside of the cauldron, so that some pressure on the encircled could be relieved and they could escape through the river crossings. There were 5 operative groups in total (from north to south): Maslennikov’s, Khomenko’s, Kalinin’s, Rokossovskiy’s and Kachalov’s. All of them failed to reach Smolensk, but their actions, especially that of Rokossovskiy, whose group was the nearest to the encircled, helped many thousands of 16th, 20th and 19th Army’s soldiers escape the cauldron. At least, a majority of 16 A units managed to do so. As a result of bloody battle around Smolensk, OKH issued directive № 34, which called for a halt in AG “Center’s” offensive. Its 4 PzA was disbanded – Army’s Tank Groups were now to be transferred to north and south and help capture Leningrad and Kiev. More than that, infantry was also ordered to go to defensive – drive on Moscow was postponed until the flanks are secured. Thus as you see Soviet active strategy proved to be pretty effective in halting the Germans. Following this directive, Guderian turned south, encircled and destroyed Kachalov’s group and now moved in the SW Front’s rear to encircle it in cooperation with 6 A, 2 A and 1 PzG. 2 A began an offensive in Gomel direction on 12th of August. During this offensive it encircled the legendary 63 RC, which fought such a surprisingly effective counterstrike a month ago, that Germans called it “the Black Corps” after Braunschweiger volunteer Black Corps, which fought bravely against Napoleon and became a symbol for military heroism. Corps’ commander Petrovskiy refused to be carried out by a transport plane and died leading the breakthrough of his unit. On 14th of August Soviet command formed Bryansk Front under command of general Yerёmenko with a task of defeating 2 PzG. However Guderian brushed its units aside and by begin of September already reached Desna river. On the northern flank Germans encircled 22 A near Velikie Luki and then occupied Toropets and Ostashkov. But in the center 9th and 4th field armies were in a defensive position, fighting off strong Soviet assaults against Dukhovshchina, Yelnya, Roslavl and Novozybkov. The most successful of those began on 30th of August – it was an offensive of Zhukov’s Reserve Front (actually only 24 A and 43 A) on Yelnya salient. Zhukov concentrated 800 guns on a narrow front and attacked with good artillery support. His plan to encircle the defending 20 AC (70 000 men) failed, but Germans still suffered heavy losses and were drawn away from Yelnya. The operation became the first Soviet operative victory in this war, 4 of the 11 participating divisions became first Soviet Guards divisions. Map: loveread.me/img/photo_books/53468/i_011.jpg
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 27, 2021 2:52:54 GMT
3.4. Southwestern direction: Uman cauldron
Kleist’s 1 PzG continued to exploit the hole between Soviet 5 A and 6 A on Kiev direction. On 11th of July, 13 PzD’s recon tanks reached Kiev fortified district. Several days later the whole 3 MC was deployed in the battle for Kiev. Meanwhile its neighbor, 48 MC, turned southeast to finally encircle SW Front. 14 MC was transferred to 1 PzG’s front and joined 48 MC in its drive. 17 A breached another hole in “Stalin’s line’s” defenses in Letichev fortified district. Its main goal was to press 12th, 26th and 6th armies east and destroy them, once they get in the encirclement made by 1 PzG and 11 A. But Army command decided to make its own, lesser, encirclement near Vinniza. However, Soviet 45 TD and 99 RD counterattacked and allowed other units to safely withdraw. Other Soviet counterattacks prevented 1 PzG from moving south and closing a bigger pocket. By 25th of July 6 A and 12 A were pressed so far south, that Stavka gave command of them to Southern Front. Nevertheless, I’ll still talk about Battle of Uman as a part of the action on the Southwestern direction. Both Soviet armies started to withdraw south to avoid the encirclement, but already on 2nd of August it was completed. 12 A began a breakthrough on Sinyukha river front. On 6th of August, command column was defeated, 6 A commander Muzychenko and some other generals got captured prisoner. On 15th of August, Uman cauldron was completely cleared up. Only some 10 000 men of 130 000 encircled broke through. But even the dead were lucky to avoid the frightful fate of the POWs. Most of them died in concentration camp built on the place of the battle. Jewish and Communist, but also ill and wounded POWs were shot by thousands, the rest had also close to none chances to survive terrible conditions in the “Uman pit”. Of course I must mention 5 A and the defense of Kiev. M.I. Potapov’s 5 A defended extraordinarily well and tied down 11 German divisions with its constant counterattacks. While all other units left “Stalin line”, 5 A held Korosten fortified district, making big use of marshy terrain in Polesie region. Thus it formed a big bulge, which became a headache for Germans. On 5 A southern flank 37 A defended Kiev from superior German forces. These two armies still held a part of Dnieper’s right bank, so AGs “Center” and “South” decided to eliminate this threat before advancing on Moscow. Guderian already advanced into SW Front’s rear, Kleist’s PzG moved from Kakhovka on Lower Dnieper to Kremenchuk undetected by Soviet intelligence. On 8th of September, 1 PzG captured a bridgehead over Dnieper in Kremenchuk to advance north and link up with 2 PzG. SW Front was now threatened by a catastrophy. Map:
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 27, 2021 14:19:47 GMT
3.5. Southern direction: hero-city of Odessa
In the middle of July 11 A pressed hard in the eastern direction to link up with Kleist’s tanks. But it soon found itself halted by “Stalin line” fortifications. Uman cauldron was closed without its help. Nevertheless, constant pressure on Soviet 9 A in Moldavia became so hard, that it decided to withdraw to the left bank of Dniester. Northern flank of this retreat was covered by 2nd cavalry corps’ (2 CC) counterattacks near Balta. On 19th of July, Southern Front command organized Separate Coastal Army from 9th Army’s southernmost units. After 1 PzG eliminated Uman pocket and advanced south to cut the Southern Front in two, this army stayed in Odessa, unable to retreat east like 9 A and 18 A. On 8th of August, garrison commander of Odessa declared the city under siege. On 13th of August, 1 PzG and Hungarian Corps finally cut off its land connection with other Soviet-held territories. Coastal Army (just 35 000 men) faced the whole Romanian 4 A (over 200 000 men). Odessa’s situation became even worse, when Romanians occupied Beliaevka on Dniester and thus blocked Odessa’s water supply from the river. Water was soon given to the population by card system (which set fixed amount of water per person). Soviet Navy was superior on the Black Sea and could constantly supply and reinforce Odessa without any obstacles. This circumstance and general inferiority of Romanian troops allowed the city to resist very long under heavy enemy strikes. Meanwhile 11 A and 1 PzG (transferred to Kremenchuk) continued to advance to Dnieper. On 2nd of September, 11 A captured a bridgehead in Kakhovka. Soviet 9 A immediately counterattacked, but couldn’t eliminate the bridgehead. A bit further north, in Zaporozhie, 274 RD managed to successfully counterattack and retake Khortiza island on Dnieper, which prevented Zaporozhie from being shelled and made an effective evacuation of its industry possible. But the main course of campaign was unfavorable to the USSR: on 9th of September, Germans began an offensive from Kakhovka. Map:
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Post by Gerd von Rundstedt on Sept 27, 2021 14:50:16 GMT
You cannot imagine how impressed I am.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 27, 2021 15:52:54 GMT
You cannot imagine how impressed I am. Thank you, Commander
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 27, 2021 17:27:39 GMT
3.6. Soviet-British relations: “Countenance”
W. Churchill held a speech supporting USSR already on the first day of the war. USSR and Great Britain, though belonging to different political and economic systems and having a long story of rivalry, soon became allies. On 12th of July both sides signed a protocol, which officially declared such status.
An obvious problem of Soviet-British relations was Poland, a big part of which was annexed by USSR in 1939. Polish government in exile, which was near to declaring war against USSR, was the second most powerful (after the French) exile state in London, so British wore responsibility regarding it. Soviet leadership realized the importance of Polish question and sent an instruction to its ambassador in Britain, I.M. Mayskiy, about future negotiations with Poles already on 3rd of July. On 30th of July, the so-called Mayskiy-Sikorskiy agreement (Sikorskiy was Polish head of government) was signed in London in presence of W. Churchill. It left the question of Polish borders out of sight, but guaranteed existence of the Polish state, organization of a Polish Army on Soviet territory and amnesty for Polish POWs in USSR.
Brits immediately began delivering war materials to USSR: first ship with British help arrived in Arkhangelsk through Arctic Ocean on 1st of August. Three weeks later the first convoy, called “Dervish”, was sent through the same route.
Both sides were interested in opening a new, safer route through neutral Iran. Other reason for an operation in this country was its pro-German policy. On 25th of August, Soviet 44th and 47th Armies from Transcaucasian republics, 53rd Army from Middle Asia and 2 British-Australian divisions and 3 brigades from Iraq began the mutual invasion. This operation was called “Countenance”.
Iranian army was inferior to its enemies in terms of equipment and tactics and many generals were incompetent and/or pro-British. Allies didn’t encounter serious resistance and entered Tehran on 17th of September. Shah Muhammed Reza Pekhlevi took over power from his father, Reza Pekhlevi, and led pro-Allied policy throughout the whole war. Occupation contingents of USSR in the north and Britain in the south stayed until 1946 and secured strategic supply route, which ran from Indian ocean ports to Soviet Azerbaidzhan. The whole Persian campaign was won at a cost of 62 lifes. WW2 in the Near East ended victorious for the Allied powers.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Sept 28, 2021 3:43:27 GMT
3.7. Conclusion
In the beginning of September, AG “North” slowed down on the outer defenses of Leningrad, AG “Center” completely stopped and went on a defensive east of Smolensk, AG “South” continued to advance fast, but now reached a solid front on Dnieper. The planned Kiev cauldron was the only thing which could revive German blitzkrieg, which raged through the whole Europe unstopped and became halted after the Battle of Smolensk.
In this battle Nazis tried to quickly encircle hundreds of thousands Soviets, just like in Western Belorussia. But Soviet counterattacks held the cauldron unclosed for two weeks, disturbing German blitzkrieg and obtaining time to use its strategic advantage in form of more effective mobilization of bigger (not by far, but still) manpower. Don’t understand it false, Battle of Smolensk was a major tactical defeat for USSR – it lost 7,5 times more men (750 000 : 100 000) and loads of territory, but in terms of strategy it was an important step in ruining Nazi plans.
As we know Soviet failure would definitely lead to the extinction of Soviet people and Germans already try to do it. They blocked Leningrad, threatening the city with starvation, if the siege won’t be lifted; they have already killed thousands of Lithuanian, Belorussian and Ukrainian Jews; they (or Ukrainian nationalists?) killed 45 Polish professors in Lvov; thousands of civilians were starved to death (mass expropriation of food was one of the main reasons for the aggression against USSR); POWs were kept in horrible conditions, all captured commissars were shot. Slavs and Jews, Soviet citizens, fought as hard as possible to avoid their total extermination.
And with help of their British allies they now might still achieve victory despite the catastrophic beginning, though it’ll be a long and bloody way…
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 9, 2021 6:53:33 GMT
I am unable to post new chapter every fortnight as I planned. You'll have to wait until the next weekend to see the 4th part
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Post by Manfred von Richthofen on Oct 11, 2021 0:04:28 GMT
impressive! check my leyte gulf lecture pls
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 17, 2021 15:48:51 GMT
Part 4.Three capitals – three battles (11.09.-04.12.1941)
4.1.”Cradle of revolution” besieged
Although German High Command ordered the operation against Leningrad to be stopped in favor of the planned operation “Typhoon” – a drive on Moscow, Leeb continued to advance. He wanted to approach closer to the city and gain possibility to shell it more intense. Wehrmacht’s plan was to block, shell and bomb Leningrad until all of its inhabitants die from bombs, gunfire and starvation. The question of supplying the city with food after occupation would be annulated in this cruel way – mass murder and destruction. Leningrad Front command (Northern Front was divided into Karelian and Leningrad Fronts on 23rd of August) assumed, main Leeb’s attack will come from Schliesselburg-Mga direction with objective of linking up with Finns on Karelian isthmus and cutting of Leningrad’s supply through Ladoga lake. But it was not the case – Germans attacked near Krasnogvardeisk (south of the city). Situation looked grim for the Soviets. On 13th of September, G.K. Zhukov arrived to Leningrad to take over command of Leningrad Front. He organised strong defence on Pulkovo heights based on artillery, including Baltic Fleet’s ship guns. KV tanks, which were manufactured on Kirov’s plant in Leningrad also became a worthy part of city’s defence. As a result, Leeb didn’t manage to occupy Leningrad or even Pulkovo heights before 4 PzG was given to AG “Center” on 15th of September. Now the city prepared to survive harsh conditions of blockade. On 20th of September GKO issued directive “About organisation of transport air connection between Moscow and Leningrad”, introducing an air bridge to the latter city. 206 ships also began to provide supplies through Ladoga lake. But Ladoga is known for its stormy weather, so this factor, together with German artillery and aviation actions, sank lots of ships during autumn 1941. On 23rd of November lake became frozen and finally automobiles could drive on its ice – the famous “Road of life”. Despite intense work these communication line couldn’t provide enough supplies for Leningrad. In November famine began. We’ll see its horrible development later. Meanwhile on other fronts in the North the fighting was also hard. On 8th of September German 61 ID and 217 ID landed on Vormsi island – one of the Moonsund islands. The whole archipelago was defended by just the 3 separate rifle brigade and German-Finnish ships launched several diversion raids to confuse Soviets regarding direction of their attack. On 17th of September, they landed on the biggest island – Saremaa. Its garrison retreated to the narrow Syrve peninsula, where it could resist until 5th of October with help of coastal batteries and self-made tanks (armored tractors). On 12-22nd of October, German invasion force fought for the fiercely defended Hiumaa. Its garrison finally evacuated to Hanko naval base; Moonsund archipelago fell into German hands. But Hanko couldn’t be held too long as well. It was defended since 22nd of June. Finns deployed a small force against its strong defences and couldn’t break through onto peninsula from land. But a seaborne operation also wasn’t an option – on 13th of September Finnish ironclad “Ilmarinen” sank on Soviet mines near Hanko, so even plans for shelling the base with warships were canceled by Finnish command. On 26th of October, evacuation of the base began. On 2nd of December, evacuation was completed. Former Hanko garrison joined defenders of Leningrad. And what about Lapland? There Germans temporarily achieved a breakthrough, but were stopped by the volunteer Polar division and then driven back to Western Litsa river. On 22nd of September, OKW ordered to stop all offensives in the region. ibb.co/7Qc08XW
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 17, 2021 15:50:37 GMT
Image link doesn't work for some reason, just copy it
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 17, 2021 18:13:22 GMT
4.2. Kiev catastrophe
While 2 PzG rushed south, SW Front transferred more and more units to the east to stop it. Bryansk Front also counterattacked the Tank Group. Front command and Stavka didn’t look at the situation grim, because they didn’t have any intelligence about the presence of 1 PzG on Kremenchuk bridgehead. As a result they only knew about the northern pincer of enemy’s attack, not about the southern. In eyes of Soviet command Guderian’s singlehanded drive to Dnieper and formation of pocket near Kiev was unrealistic. Only with the undetected Kleist’s Group this cauldron became possible. Nevertheless, Budyonniy, Southwestern direction (SW and S Fronts) commander, had a feeling of coming tragedy and urged for abandoning Kiev and maybe retreating even further east. His attitude was a “sign of panic” for Stalin and he relieved Budyonniy from command on 12th of September. In fact this experienced general was right in his apprehensions. On 15h of September, fast advancing Kleist’s tanks linked up with 2 PzG in Lokhvitsa, closing the Kiev cauldron (21 A, 26 A, 37 A, 5 A; more than half a million men). On the next day new Southwestern direction commander, marshal Timoshenko, sent via Staff officer Bagramyan an oral order to SW Front commander Kirponos to retreat to Psyol river line. Kirponos doubted genuineness of this order and called Moscow. These communication problems let the encircled SW Front to begin its breakthrough only on 17th of September, 2 days after being caught in the cauldron. Kirponos and many other generals died during breakthrough, as well as thousands of soldiers. The situation was a true catastrophe – half a million men tried to break through even bigger mass of Nazi soldiers under air bombing, low on supplies. But even in such conditions diversion and partisan-supporting groups were left on the abandoned territory (my great-granddad Yakov Soroka, train machinist on Chernigov station was left in his town in September 1941 as a part of such a group). In Kiev time mines were installed to cause destruction once German occupation administration enters the city’s main buildings (explosions succeeded to kill dozens of Nazis on 24th of September, 5 days after Kiev fell, but, unfortunately, many civilians died too). Numerous Soviet de-blocking attempts, including 2 CC offensive on Lokhvitsa, failed. On 26th of September German radio proclaimed the end of Soviet resistance in Kiev cauldron. In fact it continued a bit longer, but it couldn’t change the course of the battle - at least 380 000 soldiers became POWs (Germans give bigger numbers, but they include captured policemen, Communist active and even some railway and post workers), many others died, only general Bagramyan’s group, 5th airborne brigade under Rodimtsev (future hero of Stalingrad) and some other smaller units (21 000 men in total) broke through. Wehrmacht completed its biggest cauldron, biggest victory. Map: ibb.co/pRnt3Wx
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