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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 18, 2021 14:21:49 GMT
4.3. Breakthrough into Donbass and Crimea
In the middle of September, Odessa became the only Soviet-controlled territory to the west of Dnieper and its situation looked not so good. Romanians pressed hard in the Eastern defence sector and could now shell the harbour – the vital object for Odessa, for it is in harbour, where all supplies are unloaded from ships. To secure the harbour, Black Sea Fleet landed 2 000 Marines in Romanian rear (Grigoryevka, 16 km behind the frontline). Other units attacked east and linked up with the landing force on the same day. Romanians took heavy casualties and were driven far away from the harbour. German 11th and Romanian 3rd Armies advanced from Kakhovka bridgehead. They quickly arrived to Perekop (entrance to Crimea) and Molochnaya river. Germans prepared for a breakthrough into the peninsula, while leaving Romanians on river Molochnaya to guard their flank. Soviet command, steady in its active strategy, counterattacked Romanians on 26th of September. Main force attacked along the Dnieper bank, which secured its right flank – a new and interesting tactical idea. Romanians were routed, their 4th mountain brigade was defeated on the first day of Soviet operation. German 49th mountain corps had to come to aid to the allies and to restore the situation. Molochnaya river counterstrike brought heavy losses to the invaders and gave Soviet 51 A in Crimea some time to prepare for the defence. In the same time , on 30th of September, Coastal Army was ordered to evacuate from Odessa and strengthen Crimean defences (and so Odessa’s garrison remained undefeated, having to retreat because of the situation on another front). But despite all the gained advantages, this offensive is for some reason mostly unknown even among the amateurs of GPW history. Another Soviet success was the defence against German forces on Dnepropetrovsk bridgehead. There elements of Malinovskiy’s 6 A (this army had the same number as Muzychenko’s army, which was destroyed in Uman cauldron, but was actually a completely new unit) tied down 3 German divisions with their effective artillery fire on the river crossing. But while Southern Front defended pretty well, Southwestern was totally annihilated. Stavka’s reserves formed only a “thin red line”, which couldn’t halt the Germans. And so the Southern Front’s right flank was very vulnerable. 1 PzG immediately used this opportunity and turned south on 29th of September. On 7th of October, it linked up with Romanians near Osipenko – 9 A and 18 A became encircled. Of course, German tank units were already exhausted by previous fights by that time and a breakthrough became a possible mission for many Soviet units – big parts of 8 divisions actually achieved it. Nevertheless such a breakthrough was still very tough – 18 A commander Smirnov and many thousands of lower-ranked servicemen died in these attempts. 1 PzG and 17 A used their victory to break into Donbass – already on 17th of October Kleist’s tanks occupied Taganrog, on 26th of October Italian corps of the 17 A captured Stalino – probably the biggest success of CSIR (Italian Expeditionary Force) during the whole war. To the north of this operation German 6 A attacked Kharkov. Soviet forces halted it for a long time – autumn rains, which made country roads nearly impassable (yes, the famous rasputit-sa), helped them in this task. But we mustn’t forget about all the difficulties, which rasputit-sa caused for the Soviets – both assembling reserves to restore the front after Kiev cauldron and organising a proper retreat became tough tasks. Nevertheless, rasputit-sa is rather an unfavourable situation for the attacker. On 15th of October, Stavka ordered abandoning Kharkov due to critical situation on SW Front’s flanks. On 24th of October, Germans entered Kharkov – Soviets lost a big city (Ukrainian SSR capital in 1919-1934) and a major industrial centre – many factories like the tractors factory (which also produced T-34 tanks) weren’t evacuated properly. On 18th of October, German-Romanian forces began an offensive on Perekop and Chongar positions guarding the narrow entrance into Crimean peninsula. After garrison of Odessa was evacuated, 51 A had enough men to effectively defend these positions, but its commander dispersed his forces – 5 divisions guarded the long Crimean coastline, 3 divisions stayed in reserve, 2 divisions were on march from Sevastopol to Perekop and only 5 divisions actually stood in the first line. Regarding absolute superiority of the Black Sea Fleet, F. Kuznetsov’s decision looks absurd. By 16th of November, Perekop position was breached and the whole Crimea, except for Sevastopol fell into German 11 Army’s hands. The only positive thing was that Sevastopol seemed to defend well and tied down a whole enemy’s Army. Map: ibb.co/g3hLz6M
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 18, 2021 17:07:46 GMT
4.4. Operation “Typhoon”
The main German operation of the year, operation “Typhoon” was an ambitious drive on Moscow. Army Group “Centre” commander F. von Bock became 9 A, 3 PzG, 4 A, 4 PzG, 2 A and 2 PzG (armies listed from north to south) with support of the 2nd Air Fleet under A. Kesselring – 1 930 000 men, 2 000 tanks, 14 000 artillery pieces and 1 400 planes! OKW planned to destroy the opposing Western, Reserve and Bryansk Front units in two big cauldrons (4 and 3 PzGs with 4 A’s support to make one near Vyazma and the other to be closed in Bryansk by 2 PzG and 2 A) and then rush to the northern (Klin-Yakhroma) and southern (Tula-Kolomna) flanks of Moscow defences to encircle Soviet capital and avoid street fighting in it. Soviet High Command made some conclusions from previous fighting and put stress on defending the main roads, which German Tank Groups preferred to use in their battles on encirclement – the so called Panzerstraßen (tank roads). Smolensk-Vyazma-Moscow and Sevsk-Bryansk-Moscow were considered as such risky directions. Concentration of force there was decent – for example 112 RD held an 8-km-long frontline, its neighbor 38 RD had to hold just 4 km on Vyazma direction, both divisions had 10 000 men each one. Meanwhile on the other parts of the front (where German tanks actually attacked) divisions of comparable size held over 20 km. Soviets concentrated their limited (1 250 000 men, 1 000 tanks, 7 600 guns; compare with the German numbers) forces on wrong directions. On 30th of September, 2 PzG began its offensive. Guderian’s tanks advanced in northeastern direction – already on 3rd of October 24 MC broke into Orёl – no troops were behind the corps and Moscow. Its left neighbor, 47 MC turned north and occupied Bryansk on 6th of October. There it trapped Soviet 3rd and 13th Armies cooperating with 2 Field Army’s infantry. On 2nd of October, 3 PzG and 4 PzG joined the offensive, cutting through Soviet front north and south of Vyazma. On 5th of October Western Front commander I.S. Konev ordered 16 A commander Rokossovskiy to move to Vyazma, take command of 5 rifle divisions and a tank brigade coming from front reserves and prevent occupation of the city. Nevertheless, on 7th of October, Vyazma fell. 19th, 16th, 20th and 24th Soviet Armies became encircled. 128th tank brigade’s counterstrike on Kholm-Zhirkovskiy failed to stop German tanks. The encircled had to break through tight curtain of tank divisions. Near Orёl 24 MC split in two – 4 PzD continued advancing on Mtsensk and Tula, 3 PzD turned north to close another cauldron near Bryansk – Soviet 50th Army was almost completely destroyed there. To halt 4 PzD Soviets used their airmobile reserve – 5th airborne corps (under 8 000 men without anti-tank guns). It landed on the way to Mtsensk and gave 4th and 11th tank brigades (4 TBR, 11 TBR) and 6 guards rifle corps (6 GRC) some time to deploy. 4 TBR and 11 TBR had a lot of T-34 tanks. As they were now coordinated with artillery and used wisely by brigade commanders Katukov and Bondarev, their strikes against the enemy’s armor became very severe – Guderian decided to stop in Mtsensk until 23rd of October (13 days of operative pause!). In this time units freed after elimination of Bryansk pockets joined the vanguard and supplies were accumulated. F. Porsche himself visited Mtsensk battlefield to inspect captured T-34s. After this trip he began to develop PzKpfw. V Panther, which obtained several characteristics of T-34. Not only Guderian, but also 4 PzG, 3 PzG and 4 A commanders had to deal with most of their units cleaning up a cauldron in the deep rear of their vanguard, so that the latter had little support. Nevertheless it wasn’t a problem yet since Red Army had close to no units between advancing Germans and Moscow, so that the vanguards of AG “Centre” marched through emptiness. The only foe they faced was Soviet aviation. Finally, Germans began becoming victims of their over-confidence – believing, that the fate of Moscow is already decided, OKW ordered 3 PzG to turn north (Kalinin direction) and connect with 39 MC, advancing on Tikhvin, closing Northwestern Front in a cauldron. 4 PzG had to bypass Moscow from the north, just as planned. In fact this turn to the north gave Soviets time to gather reserves on defense of the capital. Offensive directly on Moscow however continued, though with smaller force. Deploying Soviet forces moved tank brigades forward to win time. As rasputit-sa made it only possible to move on main roads, outflanking became difficult for the Germans and these screens worked. But still, Mozhaysk, Maloyaroslavets and Kaluga fortified districts were manned by just 90 000 soldiers when Germans arrived to this defensive line. On Volokolamsk direction situation was even worse because of incomplete fortifications. K.K. Rokossovskiy, 16 A commander at the moment, wrote in his memoirs that 316 RD commander I.V. Panfilov described their position as “sitting on pegs”. Some bunkers were really not built yet and only pegs marked their future location. On 13th of October, 4 A units occupied Kaluga, on 18th Mozhaysk and Maloyaroslavets fell. Crisis on the front of the Soviet 5 A let Germans occupy Skirmanovo bridgehead on Ruza river, in the rear of Rokossovskiy’s 16 A. Rokossovskiy had no other options but to withdraw. On 27th of October, Volokolamsk was captured by Germans. But in the end of October, with deployment of massive reserves, Western Front under G.K. Zhukov succeeded in stopping the offensive of 4 PzG and 4 A. 3 PzG rushed on Kalinin and occupied it on 17th of October. But further advance was blocked by N.F. Vatutin’s operative group’s actions, so 3 PzG never moved further north than the city of Kalinin. On 19th of October, Stavka organised Kalinin Front from 22th, 29th, 30th and 31st Armies defending the area. On the southernmost flank of operation “Typhoon” Guderian resumed his offensive on 24th of October. He has seen some success, approaching on Tula already on 29th of October, but his attacking 24 MC was stopped by outnumbered Soviet units – 290 RD (2 000 men), 31 KD (500 men), 156th NKVD regiment, Tula worker’s regiment, 732nd AA artillery regiment (its 85-mm AA-guns became the core of anti-tank defence of Tula). Shrimant Peshwa Madhavrao Bhat , special for you: I’ve found information that Tula was extremely unprepared for defence (Russian historian S. Kondratenko states it). Defensive facilities near the city were ordered to be built already in August, but construction works actually stood still until October. Tula didn’t have an own fortified district like earlier mentioned cities near Moscow and the only real defence it had was a long anti-tank ditch, which proved itself effective in coming fights. To be concise: Tula was definitely not a “Verdun”. After German tanks were driven back from the city on 1st of November, Guderian planned an encircling operation together with 2 Army’s infantry. It hasn’t take place because of Soviet 50th and 3rd Armies’ counterstrike on converging directions. After the counterstrike was repelled, Tula direction finally became relatively still. Map: www.onwar.com/wwii/maps/efront/06efront.html
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 20, 2021 18:04:21 GMT
4.5. First sparks of hope: Tikhvin and Rostov
Germans realised that Leningrad is supplied through Ladoga lake, so they developed a plan to strike in eastern direction and link up with Finns on Svir river, thus occupying the whole Ladoga coastline and totally blocking Leningrad. The offensive was to be spearheaded by the only AG “North’s” mobile unit – 39 MC. Soviet forces were by that time concentrated further north – near Sinyavino, there 54 A tried to re-establish land connection between Leningrad and the country. On 16th of October, 39 MC and 1 AC easily broke through overstretched Red Army formations on Volkhov river. But Soviet command brought up reserves to the critical area and stopped German advance. On 23rd of October Germans occupied Malaya Vishera, on 9th of November they were in Tikhvin – halfway to Finns. But these two towns marked maximal enemy’s advance. Battle of Tikhvin was also the first operation with participation of Spanish volunteer Blue division (250 ID). The unit became however only supportive, flank-guarding tasks. On 12th of December, 52 A began its counteroffensive near Malaya Vishera. After a week, 4 A and 54 A joined the offensive, which led to liberation of Tikhvin on 9th of December – on the same day Leeb ordered his units to withdraw west of Volkhov river. Two weeks later this retreat was completed – only a small bridgehead in Kirishi remained in German hands. The plan of connecting with Finns failed. Another Soviet counteroffensive took place on the opposite end of the Soviet-German front – near Rostov-on-Don. That’s how it unfolded: after capturing Taganrog, 1 PzA (1 PzG was renamed to the 1. Panzerarmee, 1st Tank Army on 6th of October) had to go east, bypassing Rostov-on-Don from the north and then turn south and capture crossings over Don river, from which the Army could operate on Caucasian direction. But Soviet 9 A provided stiff resistance, so that E. von Kleist decided to cancel the maneuver and head directly to the city of Rostov. While these fights were going on, SW direction commander S. Timoshenko assembled two new armies – 56th to defend Rostov and 37th to launch a counteroffensive against 1 PzA. 37 A attacked southwest to reach Taganrog and cut off German spearhead. On 17th-21st of November, both Germans and Soviets led offensive action in the area – 1 PzA attacked Rostov and 37 A hit its flank. On 21st of November, 3 tank corps (3 PzK) occupied Rostov-on-Don, but it didn’t have any significance for Wehrmacht by now, because Soviet offensive on Kleist’s left flank didn’t let him continue the advance. But Southern Front commander’s mistake helped 1 PzA – Y. Cherevichenko re-formed his troops and stroke head-on on Rostov instead of continuing the encircling maneuver. On 2nd of December, badly hit Kleist’s tank units retreated to Mius-river front and finally stopped Soviet counteroffensive. But tbh Southern Front had close to no chances to encircle 1 PzA, even if Cherevichenko would take only perfect decisions. 37 A didn’t have enough mobile units to quickly reach Sea of Azov and cut off German tankers. After mechanized corps were destroyed during the summer campaign, the biggest mobile units in the Red Army were the tank brigades (tank regiment of 93 tanks and a motorized infantry battalion in each one). 37 A had 3 of them – not enough to exploit an operative breakthrough and to fight a blitzkrieg. Nevertheless, battles of Tikhvin and Rostov became major offensive victories of USSR, which began its first strategic offensive in this war. Liberated territory was huge in comparison to previous Soviet counteroffensives (for example, Yelnya) and the moral effect even bigger. Maps: ibb.co/G2gxJwN ; ibb.co/4SzzPYg
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 22, 2021 2:59:55 GMT
4.6. Operation “Typhoon”: 2nd round
In the middle of November roads solidified due to frost, so Germans considered it as the best time to continue their operations. 3 PzG, 4 PzG and 4 A attacked on 15th, 2 PzA - on 18th. First two Tank Groups advanced on Klin and Noginsk, where they should link up with 2 PzA coming from Tula-Kashira direction. Thus they would encircle Moscow.
On 23rd of November, 3 PzG occupied Klin, on 28th it crossed Volga-Moscow channel in Yakhroma. There it was counterattacked by newly arrived 20th and 1st Shock Armies and driven back to the western bank of the channel. Nevertheless Germans were now some 29 km from Moscow – a more than critical situation.
On the right flank not only tankers, but also German infantry went on to the offensive. 4th field army constantly pressed on Serpukhov, threatening Tula’s main supply route. Soviet intelligence stated that Germans had only 2 battalions in dense forests near the town. Belov’s 2 CC with some other units should attack and raid German rear. On 14th of November, the attack began, but cavalrymen faced 2 infantry divisions with 1 more in reserve instead of 2 battalions! In fact von Kluge planned to strike hard in that area and to encircle Soviet troops in front of Moscow. Belov’s counterattack, though gaining only a little ground, thwarted these plans.
Guderian bypassed Tula from the east, occupied Stalinogorsk on 25th of November and rushed to Oka river crossing in Kashira. His flanks were now immensely overstretched. To solve this problem Guderian wanted to encircle Tula and eliminate its garrison, freeing lots of his divisions due to a shorter front. But to achieve it he turned 3rd and 4th Tank Divisions west, so only 17 PzD was left to attack Kashira.
At first this division advanced fast through a wide hole in Soviet front. On 26th of November, 2 CC began to move from Serpukhov to Kashira to fill this gap. Already on the next day most of its units deployed in Kashira after a 60 km-long march (a clear advantage of cavalry as cheap motorised infantry) and counterattacked 17 PzD. The latter began to slowly withdraw southwards.
3 PzD and 4 PzD also didn’t achieve their objectives – though temporarily cutting off the last railroad to Tula, they failed to cut off the motorway and link up with 4 A’s infantry. As Guderian got intelligence report about Soviet 10 A massing against his weak right flank (this report was extraordinarily true), he ordered to go to defensive actions.
Further south 2 A advanced slowly but steadily against outnumbered Soviet 3 A and 13 A. On 5th of December, it captured Yelez, not knowing what price it’ll pay for this town several days later.
In the centre two more important battles occurred: Kryukovo counterstrike, which drove Germans several kilometres away from Moscow and stopped its shelling with long-range artillery, and the battle of Naro-Fominsk. There 20 AC and 4 PzK of Wehrmacht broke through Soviet 33 Army’s front, advancing deep and threatening Soviet 5 A with encirclement. French volunteer legion also participated in this operation (though some sources state, that it fought already on Borodino battlefield in October, which is nothing else but a beautiful legend), took heavy casualties and was immediately brought to reserves.
By 5th of December, Soviet counterattacks on German flanks created an unfavourable situation for the attackers and they withdrew to the previous line. At this time Stavka actively prepared a major counteroffensive against exhausted AG “Centre”, but 20th, 1st Shock, 33rd, 10th Armies and 1st guards cavalry corps (promoted 2nd cavalry corps of P.A. Belov) were already attacking, so we see how their numerous counterattacks started the Soviet general counteroffensive.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Oct 23, 2021 2:45:02 GMT
4.7. Conclusion
Russia had many capitals throughout its history, but 3 became the most important ones – ancient Kiev, majestic big Moscow and European-styled Petersburg-Leningrad. In this autumn heavy battles took place for all 3 of them – Kiev saw heroic defence and then encirclement, Leningrad continued to fight even after famine broke out in the city, Moscow slightly avoided occupation.
And near Moscow Wehrmacht really went the way from classic blitzkrieg to trench warfare. As Soviet forces were (December 1941) outnumbered throughout the whole battle, this development seems to be a real miracle. To explain this miracle Germans created myths about almighty Generals Mud and Frost (unfavourable weather conditions). In fact rasputi-tsa was unfavourable situation for both sides – as we know, Soviet defence was based on deployment of fresh units and constant counterattacks. Both of these tasks became more than hard in autumn 1941. Let’s take 25 TB as an example. On 20th of October, it was transported via railway to Istra, in army reserve of Rokossovskiy. After crisis on the front of neighbouring 5 A occurred, it drove through muddy roads all the way to Kubinka (over 50 km). Soviet documents describe this march as hell on earth. After it became apparent that Rokossovskiy still needs a tank force, fuel and time weren’t there to repeat this move. 25 TB stayed near Kubinka.
About frost: general Reinhardt (3 PzG commander after Hoth) stated that by 24th of November only a fifth of German soldiers became winter clothing. On the other side, some Soviet divisions also had up to 40% of soldiers without winter uniforms. But German legends about -40 or -50°C are false: in fact temperature rarely fell under -20°C, even on 30th of November temperature in Moscow was near zero. Situation is not as simple as German propaganda stated.
“If generals Mud and Frost would serve in the Red Army, they would be executed for betrayal” – A.V. Isaev. But if so, then what saved Moscow? First of all, we should remember that more soldiers went through the battle on the Soviet side – 2 million against German 1.6 million. Of course this number contains both units which were destroyed in Bryansk and Vyazma cauldrons and units, which re-stored the front after these encirclements, so at one point of time Soviets were always outnumbered. Of course this difference (around 25% of strength in two in time and place separated echelons) doesn’t let us say that battle of Moscow was won solely through Soviet manpower.
These units had high morale. Despite some smaller moments of panic (most notably on 16th of October in Moscow), which mostly touched civilians, Red Army was ready to fight bravely for the Soviet capital. To rise the morale of troops, traditional parades were made in Moscow and some other cities despite the danger of aerial bombing on 7th of November (Day of October Revolution 1917). The fact, that Stalin never left Moscow, even when Germans could observe it from binoculars, was also inspiring.
And the last but not least – Germans made several operative and strategic mistakes. Formations of 3 PzG and 4 PzG north of Moscow and 2 PzA south of it were both typical pockets, which would be closed easily by the Red Army if it had at least some tank corps at the moment. Unfavorable disposition dispersed German forces and made their flanks vulnerable.
And all Soviet people are eager to finally use these weaknesses of the hated enemy and liberate motherland’s territories. After first counteroffensives Soviet soldiers saw all the harshness of occupation regime. Rostov-on-Don was in German hands just for 5 days in November 1941, but Nazis still managed to kill about 1 000 Jews there. In the deep rear situation is even worse. On 29th of September, Germans began mass executions in Babiy Yar near Kiev. Tens of thousands of mentally ill, Jews, Communists and later Ukrainian nationalists (1942) were killed in this terrifying crime.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 6, 2021 17:04:51 GMT
Part 5. Barbarossa reversed (05.12.1941-20.04.1942)
5.1. Starving Leningrad
First winter of the war became a severe trial for the whole USSR, but in the first place for Leningrad. In the end of August, just before the beginning of the blockade, city’s stocks had flour, grain, meat, noodles (all the main nutrition) for around 30 days. Now they are gone for a long time and supply from the big ground isn’t enough at all. In November-December civilians got 125-375g of bread a day and should get 130-500g of meat each 10 days (in fact 60% of citizens of Leningrad didn’t get any meat for their cards until the end of the year). Soldiers and sailors of course got more – 300-500g of bread a day and 500-1250g of meat in 10 days, but it was still lower than any known nutrition norms. Starvation killed the city of Leningrad ruthlessly – 252 068 citizens died during the period of December 1941-February 1942. People fell dead on streets – life became unimaginable horror. GKO commissioner for food supply of Leningrad D.V. Pavlov said afterwards that middle of November to end of January 1941-42 was the harshest part of blockade – “Road of life” hadn’t come to maximal work intensity yet, while city’s own stocks were all empty. Another foe of the city under siege became winter weather, unusually cold that time. Leningrad was extremely low on heating materials (gas, coal, wood) and electricity (15% of pre-war production). After Germans lost Tikhvin, Red Army stopped and prepared the next offensive, with its main objective being absolute lifting the horrible siege of Leningrad. 26 A (later 2 Shock A) and 59 A needed time to arrive on designated positions via under-developed railway system of Northern Russia. Stavka planned to break German front on Volkhov river with these armies and then cut off 28 AC near Mga in cooperation with 54 A and 55 A, thus de-blocking Leningrad and defeating a big enemy force. On 4th of January 1942, 54 A attacked the enemy near Pogostie station. Here a breakthrough wasn’t possible due to weak Soviet striking group and German well-prepared entrenchment, so a real meatgrinder for little gains began. On 7th of January, 2nd Shock and 59th armies began their offensive. It also hasn’t achieved a lot. On 10th of January, Stalin ordered Volkhov Front commander K.A. Meretskov to stop the offensive and restart it after concentration of artillery and aviation. On 13th of January, the moment has come. 2nd Shock Army finally captured a big bridgehead over Volkhov and began expanding the breakthrough. Germans began closing the gap with divisions transferred from “silent” parts of front around Leningrad. On 26th of January, Volkhov Front deployed 13 CC with task of capturing Lyuban station and thus leaving German forces east of it without supplies. But ever-growing German resistance stopped Soviet troops 10 km away from Lyuban. Volkhov Front almost achieved a decisive victory. On 2nd of March, Hitler ordered AG “North” commander G. von Küchler (Leeb was fired after his defeat in Tikhvin) to close the narrow entrance to the 2nd Shock Army’s breakthrough. On 15th of March, Germans attacked from their “corner posts” in Spasskaya Polist and Zamoshie. On 20th of March, they encircled 2nd Shock Army. On 30th of March, Soviets re-captured an even narrower corridor to the army. New corridor was around 2 km wide, but Volkhov Front command still began a new offensive on Lyuban on 2nd of April, believing that its own encirclement will distract Germans from threatening Soviet supply line. But Soviet offensive failed once again, so 2nd Shock Army’s fate was now in big danger. But although de-blocking attempts of the Red Army were pretty unsuccessful, Leningrad’s supply situation still improved in comparison with 1941. On 29th of March, partisans of Leningrad and Pskov oblasts broke through to the city with a transport with food. City inhabitants planted every free piece of ground with fruit and vegetable. Ladoga flotilla worked better than in previous year and started transporting big amounts of food, oil, ammunition. returning from Leningrad, its ships evacuated children, women, wounded. Already in February civilians became 400-700 g of bread daily. However famine became lesser, but continued. ibb.co/x5HGq30 ![]()
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 7, 2021 20:29:44 GMT
5.2. First strategic counteroffensive of the Union
In the beginning of December Soviet Stavka decided, it is time to counterattack German flank forces near Moscow. Defeat of these tank units would leave infantry in the center vulnerable. To achieve these goals 30 A, 1 Shock A, 20 A and 16 A should attack on Klin, encircling 3 PzG and 4 PzG, and 50 A, 10 A and 3 A together with 1st guards CC are to encircle 2 PzA east of Tula. 29 A and 31 A near Kalinin and 13 A and 40 A near Yelets shall support the offensive’s flanks.
And the day has come. On 5th of December, Kalinin front and on 6th of December – Western front began their offensive. Kalinin direction was covered by strongly fortified German infantry, which prevented Soviets from immediate breakthrough, but 30th, 20th and 1st Shock armies stroke at weak flank of 3 PzG, main force of which was concentrated further south. 30 A tried to capture Klin – critical town for German supply line. At first 30 A advanced fast, covering 25 km just in first two days. On 13th of December, 3 PzG and 4 PzG were already in half-encirclement. But then they managed to slow down attacking Soviets and escape the pocket, abandoning Klin on 15th of December. Nevertheless Germans left behind thousands of vehicles, artillery guns, tanks. 6 PzD lost of its tanks in this operation, literally ceasing to be a mobile unit anymore. Other divisions contained some tanks, but only very few. These equipment became Soviet trophies, for example, 1st Shock Army captured 363 (mostly broken) tanks, 216 artillery pieces, 1882 vehicles and 549 motorcycles during December 1941.
South of Moscow 2 PzA also retreated, losing vehicles, guns and broken tanks on icy roads. Nothing changed for Belov’s 1st guards CC, which advanced several days long, executing Kashira counterstrike, by 5th of December. But on the next day fresh 10 A attacked Guderian’s right flank and his troops began to literally flee from the bulge east of Tula. 50 A attacked in southern and south-eastern directions on 10th of December to cut off 2 PzA’s retreat route, but the army was exhausted by previous heavy fights for Tula and didn’t get any reinforcements before the start of the offensive, so it couldn’t encircle 2 PzA. The latter still suffered a lot, retreating and leaving equipment and dead men behind.
Southern flank of Tula offensive was covered by 3rd,13th and 40th armies’ offensive on Yelets. Here South-Western Front has built 2 cavalry-mechanised groups by generals Moskalenko (northern group) and Kostenko (southern group). Their task was to encircle and destroy German 34 AC in Yelets area by a Cannae movement. On 6th of December Moskalenko and on the next day Kostenko attacked. On 14th of December, they encircled 45 ID and 134 ID west of Yelets – only a handful of the encircled broke through. Yelets operation became the first fully successful Soviet encircling offensive in GPW.
Now that most of AG “Centre’s” units retreated, coordinating this retreat became a hard task. 43 AC retreated to Kaluga, while all the other 2 PzA’s corps headed on to Belёv and Mtsensk. This retreat in different directions created a wide gap in the frontline. Soviet highly mobile 1st guards CC exploited this gap, advancing fast without facing serious resistance. Its successes let 49 A and 43 A join the offensive and liberate Kaluga on 30th of December. 5 days ago Guderian was fired because of his inability to close the gap. Advancing through it, 1st guards CC already covered 250 km since the breakthrough and now turned north in an attempt to cut off 4 A’s retreat. Cavalry’s neighbor, 10 A continued advancing west and blocked about 1 500 German soldiers on Sukhinichi station on strategic Vyazma-Orёl railway. Further north 33 A and 43 A liberated Naro-Fominsk and Maloyaroslavets.
Not only Guderian lost his job during this catastrophe for the Wehrmacht. On 19th of December 1941, W. von Brauchitsch, commander of German ground forces was replaced by Hitler in his own person, general-field-marshal von Bock lost his command over AG “Centre” to H. von Kluge. General Kuebler became 4 A commander instead of promoted Kluge. But Kuebler also didn’t command this army for long, being replaced by G. Heinrici on 20th of January. Hoepner was relieved from command over 4 PzA and Model became 9 A commander instead of Strauss. That’s a lot of replacements! Command system over Wehrmacht was in a deep crisis, while Soviets pushed hard, inspired by their first major victories and eager to liberate the Motherland.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 8, 2021 12:58:51 GMT
5.3. Rzhev-Vyazma fortress
On 7th of January 1942, Stavka developed a plan of encircling and defeating AG “Centre”. Main problem of the Red Army was absence of big tank units, able to break through and encircle large enemy formations, so cavalry corps were used instead. Advance of the fresh 39 A on Vyazma was to be spearheaded by 11 CC. While 39 A and 11 CC moved to Vyazma from the north, 1st guard CC advanced on the town from south-east. After they would meet, enemy’s 9th, 4th armies, 3rd and 4th tank armies (3 PzG and 4 PzG were renamed on 1st of January 1942), would be encircled – an ambitious plan. Germans constructed “Königsberg” line east of Rzhev and Vyazma and filled it with fresh divisions from Western Europe, where an allied invasion was highly unlikely. 4 PzA gave lots of it units to the newly-formed Stumme Group, created to close the gap on Sukhinichi direction. Soviets needed new powerful instruments to breach ever-hardening German defences. An advantage of the Red Army was that artillery regiments in divisions were directly subordinate to army staffs. Thus a concentration of firepower could be easily created in short period of time. 20 A commander A.A. Vlasov used this feature to break through strong German positions on Lama river. He concentrated 668 cannons, mortars and “Katyushas” on a 8 km-wide front and successfully attacked on 10th of January 1942. This offensive forced Hitler to order a withdrawal of his units to “Königsberg” line on 15th of January. At the same time as this strike in the centre of German formation was executed, cavalry attacked German flanks in an encircling manoeuver. 39th and 29th armies broke 23 army corps’ front west of Rzhev on 10th of January, on 12th 11 CC entered the breakthrough and attacked towards Vyazma. Two weeks later, 1st guards corps broke through Stumme Group’s defence on Moscow-Warsaw motorway and went to a raid on Vyazma. 201st airborne brigade and 250th rifle regiment landed in Znamenka, in German rear to support the cavalry. On 27th of January 8th airborne brigade joined them, also landing near Vyazma (about 3 000 men in two landings). Other operations of 4th airborne corps (ABC) were cancelled due to strong German airstrikes on Soviet airfields, from which paratroopers were transported. Unfortunately, Germans transferred 5 PzD and 11 PzD to Vyazma just in time to fight off both Soviet attack thrusts. In other case, last AG “Centre’s” supply route would be cut off and most of its divisions would be eliminated in a gigantic pocket. But at the same time, Soviet situation was also critical. 3rd and 4th Shock Armies and 22 Army broke through German front on the beginnings of Volga and linked up with 39 A between Belyi and Olenino, encircling 23 AC, concentrated around the latter town. But Luftwaffe organised an air bridge to the cauldron, bringing in supplies, so 23 AC kept fighting. Meanwhile, 9 A commander Model prepared a de-blocking strike and executed it, regaining land connection with the encircled on 23rd of January and completely encircling Soviet 29 A. 39 A and 11 CC weren’t in a real cauldron, but could be only supplied through a narrow (about 30 km wide) corridor between Olenino and Belyi, resulting in lower effectiveness of their actions. Germans reinforced and fortified both of higher mentioned towns, so that they became real strongpoints (“Schwerpunkte”) and the corridor couldn’t be widened. This method was known as “corner post tactics” in Wehrmacht and will be used throughout the whole war, but especially during current campaign, frequently. Belov also wasn’t able to capture Vyazma and leave Germans without supplies. Therefore, G.K. Zhukov ordered Yefremov’s 33 A to help Belov by an attack towards Vyazma. Yefremov’s Army was very exhausted (slightly more than 10 000 men without any tank support) and thus not fit for such task, but it still broke through weak part of German front and reached outskirts of Vyazma, linking up with Belov’s cavalry and paratroopers. Soviets didn’t have enough forces to hold their overstretched flanks and by 3rd of February, combined group of 33 A, 1st guards CC and parts of 4th ABC was fighting in encirclement. An unexpected support came from German rear – local partisans fought well against occupants and even liberated Dorogobuzh (8 000 inhabitants) with their own forces on 15th of February. Another encircled Soviet unit was 29 A near Rzhev. On 18th of February, Kalinin Front commander I.S. Konev ordered it to break through from the encirclement. Only 5 200 soldiers managed to do it in coming 10 days. Germans dealt with numerous encirclements better. On 26th of January, they de-blocked the garrison of Sukhinichi (von Gilsa Group), but were forced to abandon the town after Soviet counterattack on 29th. Other encircled garrisons (Kholm and Demyansk) were formed by Soviet offensive to north-west of Rzhev and Vyazma. NW Front’s operation was thought to be a flank support action for Kalinin Front’s advance on Vyazma, but dispersed formation of the German 16 A allowed North-Western Front to achieve more success than its neighbour. Attacking force was spearheaded by 2 tank and 4 ski battalions, able to pursue the enemy pretty fast (ski battalions were one of the special features of Battle of Moscow; they allowed Red infantry to out-manouever German infantry, which was slowed down by deep snow). On 22nd of January, 3rd Shock Army blocked some 5 500 Germans in Kholm and flanked 2 AC near Demyansk. Luftwaffe organised air bridge to Kholm, but could only drop containers, without landing, because local air field was under heavy Soviet fire. Meanwhile 4th Shock Army advanced even deeper into the enemy’s rear, almost reaching Vitebsk and Smolensk and thus advancing 250 km during the offensive. However, it was hard to attack in divergent directions and 4th Shock Army stopped in the beginning of February. 1st Shock Army, taken away from Western Front and transferred to Staraya Russa direction stroke hard and encircled 6 divisions (100 000 servicemen), among them one mechanised, of 2 AC near Demyansk on 8th of February. Soviets placed their hopes in eliminating 2 AC and advancing into AG ‘North’s” deep rear. But Germans immediately began supplying the pocket via air, so that they continued effective resistance. Air bridge for such a big amount of men was a unique example in the history of warfare. No country in the world, except for Third Reich with its large transport aviation fleet, could afford such an operation. 1/6 of all the German aviation fuel in February 1942 was used to supply Demyansk and Kholm! On 21st of April, after a month-long operation, Demyansk cauldron was de-blocked and a narrow (3-4 km wide) Ramushevo corridor was formed. On 5th of May, Germans de-blocked nearly eliminated Kholm garrison, too. Red Army didn’t have such powerful instruments like German transport aviation, so their encircled 33 A was finally destroyed in the middle of April. Its commander, M.G. Yefremov, commited suicide. Other Soviet offensives also haven’t seen much success – after taking part in liberation of Sukhinichi, Rokossovskiy found himself in heavy, but unsuccessful fighting on Orёl direction. There, on 8th of March, he was heavily wounded with a piece of an artillery shell and healed until May. On 20th of April, Zhukov stopped all offensive actions on Western strategic direction. Trench warfare became severe reality of fighting for Rzhev salient. ibb.co/FqKSWry
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 8, 2021 17:56:51 GMT
5.4. Barvenkovo bulge
Stavka planned major offensive action not only for Western and North-Western directions, but had a strategic concept of hitting Germans on the whole front – from Leningrad to Crimea, thus preventing them from manoeuvring with reserves. The general idea originally belongs to A.A. Brusilov, Russian general, who developed it during WW1 and fought one of the most successful and impressive offensives of the Great War against Austria-Hungary and Germany. The idea was creatively completed by the Red Army Chief-of-Staff B.M. Shaposhnikov 25 years later. South-Western direction (6 armies) should break through overstretched 6th and 17th field armies’ front, encircle 1 PzA in Donbass by pressing it to Azov sea coast and capture Dnieper crossings in Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozhie. Strategic aims of this offensive were to: “1. Leave the enemy without railway connection with Stalino, Melitopol, Crimea. […] 3. Force the enemy to abandon Crimea and South of Dnieper’s left bank because of supply problems. 4. Allow Southern Front to capture Kirovograd, Krivoy Rog and Nikolaev during spring campaign, supporting our [Soviet] actions on Odessa and Kiev directions.” (Quote from Timoshenko’s operational plan presented to Stavka on 19th of December 1941) As we see, Soviet offensive was more than ambitious. And its objectives would be realistic if they would concern Red Army in 1944/45. But in winter 1941/42 Red Army had no major mobile units – the mightiest being cavalry corps. And they were nothing compared to German tank corps, not even mentioning 250 000 men-strong tank groups, with which Wehrmacht fought its blitzkrieg in summer-autumn campaign. At least South-Western direction became many cavalry corps – 3 of them (1st, 5th and 6th) on a comparably narrow attack front. On 18th of January 1942, 6th, 5th and 37th Soviet armies attacked Germans between Kharkov and Slaviansk. Soviet forces in Donbass were about to join the offensive, providing supporting action for the higher mentioned armies. On 23rd of January, 5 CC and some other units liberated Barvenkovo, on 27th 6 A captured Lozovaya, on 29th 57 A cut off the only railroad supplying Germans in Donbass. It fell under full German control again after Mackkensen Group’s (4 divisions) counterattack, but Soviet progress was still magnificent. Only stiffly defended “corner posts” in Balakleya and Slaviansk held Soviet breakthrough narrow and threatened its supply lines (just like in case with 39 A and fortified towns of Olenino and Belyi). As Red Army’s assault tactic wasn’t good enough yet, these garrisons managed to hold out and distract many Soviet units, including one mobile – 1 CC. In February Soviet offensive slowed down, Germans re-installed a solid front. Barvenkovo-Lozovaya operation managed to form a big bulge, threatening Germans in both Kharkov and Donbass, but didn’t manage to achieve any strategic goals. ibb.co/0jLZHgJ
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 9, 2021 12:13:13 GMT
5.5. Battle of Crimea
In Crimea Manstein was collecting reserves and ammunition to capture Sevastopol. On 17th of December 1941, he attacked. Soviet Coastal Army provided solid resistance with big help from Black Sea Fleet (supplies, transportation of reserves + immediate gunfire support). Nevertheless, Germans made some good progress and almost reached Northern bay. To save the situation Stavka decided to use Soviet superiority on sea. It forced Germans and Romanians to disperse their force thin on the whole Crimean coast (several hundred kilometres). This insignificant cover was immensely vulnerable to Soviet landings. So a landing operation was exactly what Soviets needed. Army generals together with Black Sea Fleet commander F.S. Oktyabrskiy decided to land near Kerch and in the harbour of Feodosia, thus immediately capturing 2 ports for supply of the landed troops. After that Soviet forces were to head north-west to Perekop, forcing Germans and Romanians to withdraw from Crimea under a threat of encirclement. On 26th of December, 51 A units began landing on Azov sea coast of Kerch peninsula. German-Romanian 42 AC provided fierce resistance. On 29th-31st of December, 23 000 men of 44 A landed in Feodosia, covered by 2 cruisers and 3 destroyers. Although 44 A didn’t achieve much success in advancing north (this move would cut off German forces on Kerch peninsula), 42 AC Graph Sponek ordered his troops to withdraw from the peninsula. Withdrawal was anything but organised – Germans left behind dozens of artillery pieces, striving to save their lives. On 2nd of January 1942, Kerch peninsula was cleared from occupants. Manstein relieved Sponek from his post, former corps commander was sentenced to be shot, but then his punishment was changed to imprisonment. After these landings Manstein had to stop the assault on Sevastopol and transfer lots of his divisions to the new front in the east. But the original objective of advancing to Perekop and cutting off 11 A in Crimea wasn’t achieved. Manstein in his memoirs wrote that his army was saved only by hesitance of Soviet command, which pursued retreating Romanians without needed energy. But in fact offensive on Perekop failed mostly because of storms on the Black Sea and thaw, which made Crimean roads nearly impassable (friendly fire from General Mud  ). Soviets were forced to delay the decisive strike, but Manstein managed to attack first. On 15th of January he stroke against Feodosia and re-captured it 3 days later. This success allowed him to leave the Soviets with only one port (Kerch) and to gain better defensive position (narrow Parpach isthmus). On 28th of January, Crimean Front was organised from Soviet troops on Kerch peninsula. Its task was to break through German-Romanian front and strike on Perekop. The offensive began only on 27th of February and was a failure for the cost of 93 tanks and several thousands dead men. On 13th of March, Soviets renewed their halted offensive and finally made some progress, forming an 8 km deep bulge in northern sector of the front. Recapturing Feodosia looked as real as never before. But then Manstein got a major reinforcement – fresh 22 PzD. It lost 35 tanks (a quarter of the full strength!) in its very first attack on 20th of March, but was a considerable force even after taking such heavy casualties. After the exhaustion of both sides, fights on Parpach isthmus calmed down. Crimean Front couldn’t overrun the enemies, but its presence alone guaranteed Sevastopol’s safety and held the whole German 11 A in strategic dead end of Crimean peninsula. ibb.co/F4sp6Lm
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 11, 2021 15:07:03 GMT
5.6. New ally (USA) and the role of lend-lease
On 7th of December 1941, Japanese carriers launched planes for the attack on Pearl Harbor – American Pacific Fleet Base. USA found themselves in a war against Japan – and in the Second World War. On 11th of December, Germany and Italy declared war on the USA. From now on US will participate in Allied operations in Africa and Europe and so cooperate with Great Britain and USSR. But since Americans were pretty safe being separated from main battlefields in Eurasia with two oceans, their main war effort was their large war industry production.
On 11th of March 1941 (Americans are still neutral!), US Congress enacted An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, introducing partially free aid to GB, Free French and China. Americans provided equipment and materiel to these countries, asking for payment for intact equipment after the war, though returning it to USA without rental payment was also an option. As you see, conditions were extremely good and meant to help the warring Allied nations in the first place, not to make money. On 28th of December 1941, USSR was added to this program.
There were three main routes, through which lend-lease was delivered. The main one was at first the sea way from Britain around Scandinavia to the ports of Murmansk and Archangelsk. Sailing in these waters was very difficult, not only because of storms, long polar night and iceberg danger, but also because of immediate proximity to German fleet and aviation bases in Norway, which sometimes caused big casualties to transport convoys (more on that later). Later the route through Pacific ocean became more important, but it also had problems in form of low throughput of Soviet Far East ports and Trans-Siberian railway. At least Japanese never seriously tried to interrupt this supply route. After the earlier mentioned operation “Countenance” (Soviet-British occupation of Iran), allies began supplying USSR through Persia. This route was safe, but Iranian infrastructure became ready for large-scaled transportations only in summer 1942. A tiny part of lend-lease was brought on ships sailing through Northern sea route (along the Arctic coast of Siberia) and in 1945 Allies led several convoys through Mediterranean and Black seas.
Americans and later Canadians supplied USSR with food, tanks, planes, ships, vehicles, locomotives, gunpowder and explosives, aluminium, cobalt, tin, clothes and shoes (especially after the war in 1945-1946) and many other things. This help was mostly selfless: post-war agreements decided that about 90% of it will remain gratis. This bright page of American-Soviet relations was unfortunately mostly overlooked during the Cold War and only now comes the real appreciation of that aid. My grandmother, who was born in 1939, still gratefully remembers how Americans provided all the clothes she had in the hard after-war period.
But appreciation of lend-lease radicalised to statements that USSR wouldn’t be able to restore its army after defeats in 1941 without foreign help and that without lend-lease the war would be lost. Many patriotic Americans unfortunately also share and strongly support this misbelief, trying to make their country responsible for all Allied victories in WW2, even on fronts where US Army never fought.
Allies gave USSR 18 297 planes and 12 199 tanks. It seems to be a big number. But regarding the fact that Soviet industry produced 120 000 planes and 74 000 tanks (!) during the war and already had 12 500 planes and 23 000 tanks before the war, Allied share in Soviet aviation and tank forces constitutes just 12,1% and 11,2% respectively. More than that, while lend-lease planes (mostly “Airacobras”, “Spitfires” and “Hurricanes”) were of high quality, one can’t say the same about lend-lease tanks: fighting value of M3 Stuart, Mk. IV Churchill (criticised by Churchill himself) or M3 Lee was pretty questionable and comparably good M4AD Sherman arrived in considerable numbers only in 1944.
Lend-lease fans point out that Americans and Canadians delivered 480 000 vehicles to USSR, while it built just 260 000 vehicles during the war. But they ignore the fact that Red Army already became 500 000 vehicles from the own Soviet pre-war reserve. Nevertheless, I must agree that American automobiles were a precious help. We see a completely different situation with railway carriages – Allies brought us 10 times more than Soviet wartime industry produced, but counting them together with 600 000 carriages that USSR already had in 1941 gives us a tiny number of just 1,7% of GPW carriages being brought with lend-lease. To sum it up: lend-lease delivered just 4% of the total Soviet equipment.
At the same time, lend-lease made up a third of Soviet explosives, doubled the production of cobalt and tripled that of tin. Americans also delivered 4 500 000 tons of food during the 4 years of the war, which seems to be a large amount, but could supply 200 million Soviets only for 3 weeks long – the rest of food was produced in USSR.
Another important point to keep in mind is that most of lend-lease production arrived already after the hardest moments of GPW. In 1941 Allies delivered just 360 778 tons of supplies, 2 453 097 tons in 1942, 4 794 545 tons in 1943 and came to peak in 1944, delivering 6 217 622 tons of supplies, 3 673 819 tons arrived in 1945. Moscow was saved in November-December 1941 with barely any Allied help. For example, how could 466 lend-lease tanks, which USSR had in December, radically change the situation, while USSR already possessed 7 700 own tanks? Red Army won all the hardest decisive battles (Moscow, autumn fights for Leningrad, Stalingrad, Caucasus) in the period, when there was only a little foreign aid.
Of course, Allies were willing to provide as much help as possible from the very beginning of the war. Only objective reasons like higher mentioned problems of the supply routes prevented them from doing it on early stages of GPW. Alone the determination, with which British sailors sailed in supplies through the Arctic ocean to Murmansk under constant threat from German fleet and aviation disproves conspiracy theories about Anglo-Americans, passively waiting for the outcome of the Eastern Front fighting and joining the winning side.
To conclude I’ll just give word to Anastas Mikoyan, Soviet People’s Commissar (Minister) for Foreign Trade in 1938-1949:
“…our soldiers received at once significant additional calories, when American stew, mixed fat, egg powder, flour, and other products began to come to us! And not only the soldiers: something also fell into the rear. Or let's take the supply of cars. After all, as far as I remember, taking into account the losses on the way, we received about 400 thousand first-class cars of the time, such as "Studebaker", "Ford", "Willis" and amphibians. Our entire army actually ended up on wheels and what kind of wheels! As a result, its maneuverability has increased and the pace of the offensive has noticeably increased.
Yes ... without Lend-Lease, we would probably have fought for another year and a half more.”
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 12, 2021 16:14:01 GMT
5.7. Conclusion
1941 was a terrible year. Since the war began it looked like a never-ending series of defeats, retreats, surrenders, enormous suffering for civilians, POWs, wounded and ill soldiers… Red Army gave up immense territory of the Motherland – with heroic fight, which overshadowed all wars against invaders so far in the history of humanity, true, but the territory was given up. Who could think of the Soviet victory in October 1941, when Western, Bryansk and Reserve Fronts were destroyed and the way to Moscow lay open? But Soviet people still resisted and hoped for a victory over the invaders.
Now the victory has come – AG “Centre” retreated from Moscow in haste, leaving equipment behind. Thousands of lost tanks and vehicles temporarily (until spring 1942) made the pride of the Wehrmacht, 4th, 3rd and 2nd Tank Armies, usual field armies without any advantages in mobility. The frontline runs more than 200 km away from Soviet capital and Germans are in defensive position and under threat of major encirclement on Vyazma-Rzhev bulge. Thousands of cities, towns and villages are liberated from Nazis. Moral impact was very high.
But the victory isn’t complete. Red Army regained its strength after even heavier defeats, so why would Wehrmacht disintegrate just like this? USSR stroke on all strategic directions to prevent maneuvers of units along the frontline, but it couldn’t prevent deployment of reserves from Western Europe; Red Army had cavalry corps and tank brigades to exploit its breakthroughs, but they weren’t as strong as German instruments of blitzkrieg – Tank Groups/Armies and were easier to repel; Soviet forces were good at offensives on open terrain, but lacked assault tactic skills to breach German defensive lines. Red Army wasn’t ready to defeat Germans once and for all yet, while its ambitious objectives led to several defeats (encircled 33 A and 29 A) and heavy meat-grinders of trench warfare (Pogostie, Lyuban, Orёl direction, Crimea). And the sieges of Leningrad and Sevastopol still weren’t lifted. German blitzkrieg is over, Soviet has by now failed. None of the sides – neither Germans, nor Soviets could be concerned in their victory in spring 1942.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 27, 2021 8:00:41 GMT
Part 6. Preparation for the second spurt (21.04.-27.06.1942)
6.1. Defeat of the 2nd Shock Army and collaborationism
On 5th of April 1942, Hitler signed OKW directive №41, which has set Leningrad as one of the primary objectives for German Army this year. An offensive against the city was however impossible before the liquidation of the 2nd Shock Army, which formed a deep bulge on Lyuban direction.
On 20th of April, A.A. Vlasov, who earlier commanded 4 mech corps, 37 A and 20 A and was a pretty talented general, became commander of the 2nd Shock Army. His superior, Leningrad Front commander M.S. Khozin, asked General Staff to evacuate the salient because of insufficient supply situation on 11th of May. New Chief of General Staff Aleksandr Vasilevskiy approved his plan.
Germans saw that Soviet units are evacuating from the bulge and began their offensive ASAP – on 22nd of May. 4 divisions and 1 brigade attacked narrow “bottleneck” in Myasnoy Bor. On 30th of May, Germans completed the encirclement of the army. More than 40 000 Soviet soldiers were now in a cauldron. On 22nd of June, 59 A temporarily opened a 400 m wide corridor, which allowed 2 000 encircled (mostly wounded) to escape from the horrible trap. But on the next morning the cauldron was closed once again. Vlasov’s army began breaking through the solid German front. This attempt disorganised the army and destroyed it. Germans captured 33 000 POWs. 6 000 men broke through. As long as the army was an organised unit it didn’t capitulate, its soldiers fought until the end, unlike the army’s commander, A.A. Vlasov. On 11th of July, he was captured by the Germans.
Imprisoned, he opened one of the most horrid pages of the war. On 27th of December 1942, he published the so-called Smolensk declaration, announcing organisation of “Russian Liberating Army” (Русская Освободительная Армия, РОА, ROA). This structure collaborated with Germans to “create the New Russia, free from bolshevism and Anglo-American capitalism” in an “alliance with the Greater Germany”. In fact Germans continued their policy of “lebensraum” and weren’t planning to let any Russian state, Communist or not, exist.
At first ROA members were volunteers, but as Nazis understood that the new “movement” is very unpopular among the Soviet POWs, they began summoning prisoners regardless of their personal attitude. De-facto ROA was a phantom, because its members were dispersed between separate battalions and brigades integrated into German command system – Vlasov didn’t command all these units. ROA battalions were mixed with regular Wehrmacht units and later even got German commanders because of German mistrust against collaborators. And they were right in their suspects – thousands of ROA soldiers went over to partisans or the Red Army, so in 1944 Germans transferred all collaborators from the Eastern Front to other theatres of war – Italy, France and the Balkans.
Unfortunately, Vlasov’s “army” wasn’t the only one Russian/Soviet collaborationist formation in WW2. White emigrant, former Don Cossack leader Krasnov and, Cossack sympathizer, German general Pannwitz organised a “Cossack division” in Waffen-SS. Other SS-troops from collaborationists were 14th Waffen-Grenadier division of the SS “Galicia” (Ukrainians, mostly from western regions), volunteer legion “Idel-Ural” (Tatars), Turkestan legion (Middle Asian people), 2 Latvian and 1 Estonian Waffen-SS divisions.
Many Soviet citizens were forced or volunteered to help German troops in non-combat tasks (“willing to help” - “Hilfsbereitwillige”, or short “Hiwi”) or to build lower level of occupation administration (“Polizei”; this word means “police” in German and is rather neutral, but after GPW it has the same meaning as “collaborationist” in common Russian. Fun fact: reform, which renamed Russian police called “militia” into “police” in 2011, has seen some opposition among Russians).
Let’s look at the biggest of these movements in detail. White emigration was an obvious source of people willing to fight against Communism. But despite the claims of Soviet propaganda, most of former Whites stayed neutral or helped the Allies and even USSR. Famous White general A.I. Denikin, who lived in France under German occupation, refused cooperation with Nazis, convinced other Whites to do the same and even managed to transfer money to Allies for a carriage of medicine, which was equipped and sent to USSR over a lend-lease transport on Denikin’s request. Vera Obolenskaya, daughter of a White emigrant, became a major figure in French Resistance and was killed by Gestapo. Only about 10-20% of White emigrants and their children joined pro-Nazi organisations and military formations – they can be considered as traitors of White Army, which was meant to be a Russian patriotic movement.
In Galicia (Western Ukraine) anti-Polish and anti-Communist sentiments were popular already in the interwar period. They resulted in rising influence of Fascists. In 1929 they built the Ukrainian Nationalist Organisation (Організація українських націоналістів, ОУН, OUN), which took responsibility for several terrorist actions, most popular of them being assassination of Polish inner minister B. Pieracki in 1934. Long before the war OUN leadership regarded Nazi Germany as the most likely ally in the fight for independent Ukrainian state. But Germans decided that Ukraine is too big to let it become a client state like Slovakia or Croatia and that such a satellite state can become too powerful and exit German sphere of influence. Therefore they arrested several OUN members after they declared independence in Lvov, on 30th of June 1941. In 1942 Germans even executed several hundred Ukrainian nationalists and some of their living comrades began a partisan war against Nazis. But many Ukrainian battalions continued fighting under German command. In 1943-1944, when Soviets successfully liberated Ukraine, OUN completely stopped anti-German actions and again built a united anti-Soviet front with Nazis.
Baltic collaborationism was of similar nature, but had stronger support amid the civilian population because of humiliation of their national dignity in 1939, when they lost their independence to USSR. Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian nationalists participated in German crimes against humanity in their own countries, in Northern Russia, Bielorussia and Ukraine. They helped Nazis to kill up to 100 000 Jews, Soviet POWs and Anti-Fascists in Ponary, killed thousands of partisans and civilians in the operation “Winter magic”, burnt down several villages in Leningrad oblast… Numbers of Baltic collaborationists are extremely high, just in Latvia 150 000 men went through service in German commanded structures in 1941-45, while the total Latvian population numbered less than 2 000 000 inhabitants. The explanation is the conscription to formally “volunteer” battalions and legions. Nevertheless there were also many real volunteers, who even continued anti-Soviet partisan war after the Victory over Nazism.
Muslim people of USSR (Tatars, Crimean Tatars, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Chechens etc.) were also pretty dissatisfied with Soviet rule, especially regarding anti-religious policy and destruction of traditional nomadic lifestyle of Kazakhs through collectivisation, which caused famine in 1930s. Therefore they also formed several collaborationist units, but I’ll talk about the issue later, when we’ll come to the deportation of Crimean and Caucasian people.
Total number of Soviet collaborationists is around 1 200 000 men – that’s a lot, but not a very big percentage, regarding that over 70 000 000 people lived under occupation and that there were up to 5 000 000 Soviet POWs.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 28, 2021 7:02:20 GMT
6.2. Western direction: Belov’s raid
As we remember, Stavka stopped all offensives on Western direction on 20th of April 1942. But Belov’s cavalry group was still in the enemy’s rear and its fate should be decided in the coming weeks. Since the beginning of the raid in January 1st guards cavalry corps has seen a lot of heroic fighting alongside with partisans, who formed 2 regular divisions. Communications of 4th and 9th German Armies were in constant danger, but Belov couldn’t cut off Smolensk-Vyazma railway and decisively encircle and defeat the enemy on Rzhev-Vyazma bulge.
In fact, cavalrymen fought in a partisan action though controlling a large territory. These fights were very specific. Being in the same area, where Western and Reserve Fronts were encircled and destroyed last autumn, Belov’s group found lots of abandoned artillery guns and tanks, repaired them and formed new units. Local partisans were also in most cases encircled regular soldiers, so they manned new artillery batteries and tank battalions, making the encircled group actually stronger despite all the harsh fighting in the enemy’s rear! Corps staff temporarily served as civil administration on the liberated territory and engaged in such non-combat tasks like for example sowing grain. Its horses were a big help to local peasants who have lost most of their own horses during the hard period of occupation.
But Belov couldn’t stay in encirclement forever. On 24th of May, German 4 AC ad 43 AC, outnumbering 1st guards CC by far, began an offensive to defeat the latter. Germans could afford to concentrate such forces because of passivity of the main Soviet forces. Soviet command decided to break through to the cavalrymen with a decisive strike by the 50 A, but worsened situation in the South stole Front reserves designated to do this operation. Belov should break through on his own.
On 9th of June, the breakthrough began. The shortest route was blocked by strong enemy’s forces, so 1st guards CC turned west and then southeast to arrive in the Sukhinichi area. On 25th of June, heroic corps finally broke through from the enemy’s rear. Belov’s raid finished.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Nov 28, 2021 14:36:50 GMT
6.3. 2nd battle of Kharkov
On 5th of April 1942, Hitler signed OKW directive №41 “Case Blue” (“Fall Blau”). It was a plan of German 1942 campaign and put stress on the southern part of the Eastern Front. German High Command realised its inability to advance at all strategic directions at the same time, like it was in 1941, but was sure that Wehrmacht still can achieve a decisive success in the southern sector. This part of the frontline was chosen because of its strategic importance: occupation of the oilfields near Groznyi and Baku (Caucasus) would leave USSR without crucial oil supply and thus give the Germans a critical strategic advantage in terms of long lasting war of attrition, which began after German defeat near Moscow. According to the plan, AG “South” had to be reinforced by 4 PzA, it should then strike on Voronezh direction, turn south and encircle Soviet Southern Front, opening the way to the Caucasus. After that AG “South” was to be split in two: AG “A” (1 PzA and 17 A, originally also 11 A in Crimea, which had to cross the Kerch Strait and land in Kuban) should continue the drive south and capture the Caucasian oilfields, while AG “B”(2 A, 2 Hungarian A, 8 Italian A, 3rd and 4th Romanian Armies, 6 A, 4 PzA) had to build a defencive front on the Don river, covering the rear of Caucasian offensive “Edelweiss”. But Soviet Barvenkovo bulge was an obvious obstacle for the coming offensive. It had to be liquidated in an encircling movement before the beginning of “Case Blue”. Soviets, however, weren’t going to be passive and wait for this operation, but planned an offensive of their own. Its goals were to “capture Kharkov, re-form the troops, capture Dnepropetrovsk and Sinelnikovo with a strike from northeast, thus leaving the enemy without an important Dnieper crossing and Sinelnikovo railway junction.” [ general Bagramyan, C-o-S of the South-Western Front]. In detail early stages of this offensive would look the following way: 6 A from Barvenkovo bulge and 21 A and 28 A northeast of it break through German front to the south and east of Kharkov, then infantry of these armies encircles German 51 AC southeast of Kharkov, while mobile groups: 21st and 23rd tank corps in the south and 3rd guards cavalry corps in the east march to the rear of the German garrison of Kharkov, completing another encirclement. Left flank of the operation was to be covered by Bobkin’s Group’s (393 RD, 270 RD, 7 TB and 6 CC) advance on Krasnograd. Here I should talk about new Soviet mobile units – tank corps. First 4 of them were organised on 1st of April 1942. Each included 2 tank and 1 motorised brigade (later 3 tank brigades and 1 motorised). There were - 5 603 men - 100 tanks - 539 vehicles - 20 76,2-mm guns - 12 45-mm anti-tank guns - 20 37-mm AA guns - 4 120-mm mortars - 42 82-mm mortars - 66 anti-tank rifles in a tank corps. Disadvantages of this formation are obvious: lack of heavy artillery, lack of infantry support. Of course it was much better than mechanised corps in 1940-1941 (each tank in the tank corps is supported by 1 artillery piece/mortar and up to 50 infantrymen/artillerists/servicemen from supportive formations, while in a mechanised corps each tank could rely only on 0,35 artillery pieces/mortars and less than 35 infantrymen/artillerists/others), but still far away from the ideal. And we should keep in mind that despite being called a corps, a Soviet TC was half the size of a German tank division. Now Red Amy will try to achieve success with these new formations, though the task won’t be easy – Germans prepared for operation “Fredericus” (encirclement of Barvenkovo bulge) and already concentrated 4 infantry and 2 tank divisions in Army Group reserve. On 12th of May 1942, both Soviet strike groups attacked the enemy and broke through on the first day of the offensive. German 6 A immediately deployed both of its reserve tank divisions to repel Soviet attack in the north, but the offensive continued. On 13th of May 28 A (northern strike group) encircled German strongpoint in Ternovaya, which had to be supplied by air. On 14th of May, Paulus was almost in panic – he proposed to cancel “Fredericus” and transfer Kleist’s tank divisions, deployed to the south of Barvenkovo bulge, to Kharkov, just to save his army from destruction. But Halder was more cold-hearted and insisted on sticking to the plan, effectively saving Germans from the defeat in this battle as we’ll see later. Meanwhile Soviet 6 A commander Gorodnyanskiy didn’t deploy 21 TC and 23 TC in time, giving time for Germans to react. Tank corps began fighting only on 17th of May, but it was already too late – on the same day Kleist’s group attacked Barvenkovo bulge, threatening to encircle Soviet 6 A, 57 A, 9 A. 23 TC, which advanced pretty successful, was forced to abandon its offensive on Kharkov and turn south to repel the German attack. But Soviets didn’t have enough time to build a solid defensive front against Kleist, who already broke through 9th Army’s formation, outnumbering it 2:1. On 22nd of May, the encirclement of 3 Soviet armies was completed. In the end of May the encircled armies were defeated. Only 27 000 men broke through, Germans estimate number of POWs as 240 000 men, which however seems a bit exaggerated, though at least 170 000 definitely were caught in the cauldron. AG “South” achieved a victory being itself on the verge of a catastrophe. German command decided to use this success by starting offensive operation “Wilhelm” and capture some ground in the east, which means taking a bridgehead over Severskiy Donets and thus a better starting position for the “Case Blue”. After concentrating strike groups – a tank one south and an infantry group north, Germans attacked 28 Army’s flanks on 10th of June. 28 A stayed outflanked on both sides for too long and slightly escaped a cauldron with help of 13 TC’s counterattack. However, its 244 RD failed to escape and was encircled on 12th of June. Then Soviets stabilised the front and Germans began regrouping to strike further south in operation “Fredericus II”. It began on 21st of June. Kleist’s tanks broke through to Kupyansk on river Oskol, attempting to capture a bridgehead, but 1st exterminatory division (artillery unit with 96 anti-tank guns and 324 anti-tank rifles – a serious argument against enemy tanks) stopped them near the town. Germans failed to cut off Soviet 38 A and 9 A from the river crossings and they retreated in full order. Germans gained good positions for the coming offensive. 
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). Soviets were forced to delay the decisive strike, but Manstein managed to attack first. On 15th of January he stroke against Feodosia and re-captured it 3 days later. This success allowed him to leave the Soviets with only one port (Kerch) and to gain better defensive position (narrow Parpach isthmus).
