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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Dec 1, 2021 6:47:31 GMT
6.4. Manstein’s triumph
In May 1942, Manstein concentrated 8 divisions (among them one tank division – 22 PzD) and 2 brigades against Soviet Crimean Front forces on Kerch peninsula in preparation for the operation “Bustard hunt” (“Trappenjagd”). 22 PzD was massively reinforced after taking heavy casualties in March and was still one of the best tank units in Wehrmacht – 2 of its 4 motorised infantry battalions were equipped with armoured troop-carriers “Hanomag” – an innovation for early 1940s. Another reinforcement of German-Romanian troops in Crimea was 8th air corps of Wolfram von Richthofen (cousin of the famous “Red baron”, WW1 ace Manfred von Richthofen), which gave Germans aerial superiority over the peninsula. Plan of the operation was to break through the Soviet front on the Black Sea coast (there Soviet formation wasn’t dense), deploy 22 PzD in the breakthrough and rush east and then north to encircle Crimean Front. After annihilating it, 11 A should be able to quickly advance on Kerch and recapture the whole Kerch peninsula. On 7th of May, German aviation massively bombed Soviet HQs and communication lines on Kerch peninsula. On the next day 30 AC broke through Soviet lines. On 10th of May, 22 PzD attacked and turned north as planned. On the next day it reached Azov Sea, cutting off Soviet 47 A and 51 A. On 14th of May, Soviet Chief-of-General Staff A. Vasilevskiy ordered an evacuation of reminding units from Kerch peninsula. But despite all expectations unsupplied encircled units continued to resist on their tiny piece of ground, constantly shelled and bombed by the enemy, for several days. Units, which stayed out of the encirclement and retreated to Kerch also defended heroically. Their rear-guards covered the evacuation until 20th of May. Some of them hid in Adzhymushkai catacombs, where they will continue partisan fighting for another 170 (one hundred seventy!) days. But behind this desperate heroism we see hard mistakes of Crimean Front command. It failed to take the initiative earlier, allowing the enemy to grow its forces without any Soviet counteraction; didn’t care about the weak southern flank; organised counterattacks against 22 PzD too late (there was an anti-tank ditch in the Soviet rear and nobody attacked German tanks while they were halted by it, so German engineers built bridges over the ditch and this frontier didn’t help Soviets at all). Stavka representative on the Crimean Front L. Mekhlis realised his mistakes and wanted to meet his death in combat, madly sticking to the heaviest rear-guard fighting near Kerch, but no bullet and no shell killed him despite this insanity. Fighting for Kerch peninsula was an apocalyptic catastrophe. Defeat of the Soviet Crimean Front let Manstein begin a decisive assault on Sevastopol. He concentrated large forces against the city, while leaving just 3 Romanian, 1 German divisions and the motorised brigade “Grodek” guarding the coastline – Soviets were no more capable of launching another great landing operation after the Kerch catastrophe. So now Manstein deployed 9 divisions (7 German and 2 Romanian) against Sevastopol, supported by the strongest German artillery group throughout the whole war: 1325 artillery pieces and 720 mortars on a frontline just 34 km long! And this group was also great in terms of quality: it had 80 (!) heavy and super-heavy batteries with monstrous guns like 420-mm “Gamma”, 600-mm “Odin” and 800-mm “Dora”. Gun-crew of the “Dora” numbered 4 000 men! This mass of infantry and artillery, totalling 203 000 men, was supported by one of the strongest air units of the Reich: 8th air corps. Defending Soviet Coastal Army was strongly outnumbered and outgunned, having 7 rifle divisions, 4 rifle brigades, 2 Marine regiments, 2 tank battalions (38 T-26), 10 artillery regiments and 2 mortar squadrons (606 artillery pieces and 1 061 mortar), supported by just 53 planes on the local airfield. Soviet disadvantage in artillery looks not so big, when we look on the numbers, but let’s keep in mind that the heaviest Soviet guns were 4 305-mm coastal guns – close to no heavy artillery in comparison to the 80 German batteries. All in all defenders of Sevastopol numbered 119 000 men. On 2nd of June 1942, 11 A began artillery and aviation preparation of the assault. It lasted for 5 days without a pause. On 7th of June, Germans attacked on the northern flank. Their plan was to advance on converging directions, forcing 386 RD and 8th Marines brigade (8 MB) abandon their positions in the mountains, capture Sapun-Gora height overlooking the city and arrive to the Northern Bay, making it unusable for bringing up supplies and thus making all of the further Soviet resistance impossible. On 10th of June, 30 AC in the south joined the offensive. The fighting was fierce. Germans advanced slowly but steadily. Soviet Black Sea Fleet tried to support the defenders with supplies, reinforcements and gunfire, just like in December, but total air superiority of the enemy made the navy support far less effective. After several transports were sunk, supplies and reinforcements arrived mostly with submarines, carrying capacity of which is of course not very big. Throughout this month Black Sea Fleet brought 21 000 soldiers and 5 512 tons of ammunition and evacuated 34 000 civilians and wounded soldiers, which was far from enough. On 23rd of June, Soviets lost everything north of the Northern Bay. Situation looked grim, so on 26th of June Black Sea Fleet command risked to send a big ship to Sevastopol – cruiser “Tashkent”. It brought 142 RB and evacuated 2 300 civilians and wounded, but almost sunk on the way back to the base in Novorossiysk, so Soviets didn’t wage to repeat such attempts in the future. “Tashkent” was the last big ship, which arrived to Sevastopol during the siege. On 29th of June, 2 German regiments crossed Northern Bay on boats and captured a bridgehead on its southern bank. Sapun-Gora was also lost, Soviets now held only a half of the area they defended a month ago. Sevastopol’s defence began to disrupt. Radio stations were destroyed to prevent them from capturing by the enemy, all remaining planes flew away to Anapa (Kuban). On 30th of June, high-ranked commanders were evacuated, while the battle went on. Of course, commanders are a worthy resource and need to be educated for many years, so losing all of Sevastopol’s high ranks would be unaffordable. But soldiers who were left without command could only regard this as a treachery. This evacuation is unjustified. In 1941-1942 Soviet commanders mostly refused to leave their troops to die alone (Muzychenko, Ponedelin, Petrovskiy, Lukin, Potapov, Kirponos, Smirnov, Yefremov…), so the evacuation of Coastal Army command is more than questionable. I personally find it was a big mistake, which dropped the morale of Sevastopol’s defenders low. Feel free to discuss in this thread how you find the decision. On 4th of July, Germans broke through to the Khersones Point. Remaining Soviet soldiers there were exhausted, undersupplied, upset because of the evacuation of their commanders, there were lots of not evacuated wounded. They began to give up. Germans claimed to take 95 000 POWs. Germans and Romanians lost up to 37 000 men during the last assault. 1942 campaign was at its very beginning, but Manstein already gained his second major victory. Crimea fell entirely into German hands and 11 A was now free to be used elsewhere on the Eastern Front.  
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Dec 9, 2021 19:47:13 GMT
6.5. Conclusion
In May-June 1942 Germans successfully prepared for their decisive offensive in summer campaign. 2nd Shock Army was destroyed, 1st guards CC was forced to abandon the area in the German rear, Barvenkovo bulge was eliminated and Crimea cleared from Soviet troops. Nazis set their eyes on Caucasian oilfields and the city of Leningrad. This summer will see a German attempt to regain the strategic initiative and win the war in the shortest period of time.
Meanwhile USSR lost hundreds of thousands men and is temporarily incapable to any major offensive action. Soviet intelligence knows that the enemy is preparing to strike once again and is also aware that he won’t be able to attack everywhere like last year, so defining the threatened direction is its main task now. Therefore, Germans launched disinformation operation “Kremlin”, trying to convince the Soviets, that the main strike will be directed against Moscow. It was an operative plan for an offensive on Western strategic direction – 2 PzA and 4 A had to cut off Sukhinichi salient and break through to Kaluga and Moscow. Germans never planned to really launch this operation, but developed the plans in detail and sent them to field army, corps and divisional level command in closed envelops. Respective staffs had to open the envelops on designated day, so the operation was kept secret as usual, but Soviet spies could steal these envelops, which also happened in reality, so Stavka was informed of these fictive plans. That was exactly what Germans expected: by stealing false plans Soviet intelligence contributed to German disinformation with its skill.
Other measures were creation of fictive divisional and corps staffs in AG “Centre” with radio stations, which sent false messages, which were also intercepted by Soviet intelligence. Ferry means were concentrated in the 2 PzA, as if it intended to cross river Oka. Recon planes made lots of flights over cities in Central Russia and on middle Volga. AG “Centre” threw 11 252 000 (!) flyers on Soviet positions west of Moscow. In these flyers it hinted that it is about to launch a major offensive on Moscow. It also prepared fictive airfields with dummies of planes to mislead Soviet air reconnaissance. As you see operation “Kremlin” was a serious complex of measures, which have also seen lots of success. In January-February 1942 Soviet intelligence reported that if Germans are to counterattack then they’ll do it in the south to reach Caucasus, but in June German disinformation convinced it that operation “Kremlin” is a real thing.
But on 19th of June, an incident seriously threatened the secrecy of “Fall Blau”. Chief of operations department of 23 PzD, mayor Reichel, flew from the HQ of 40 PzK to the frontline with some secret documents about tasks and deployment of 40 PzK and its neighbours, actually relating to almost the whole German operation against Voronezh. His “Fieseler-Storch” accidentally flew over Soviet positions and was shot down. Soviet soldiers tried to capture the Germans, but they provided resistance and were killed in fight. Red Army captured the documents. On the same day they were sent to Moscow. Despite all the claims that Stalin never listened to his staff and intelligence, he actually ordered a reinforcement of the Bryansk and South-Western Fronts. 4 TC, 214 RD, 343 RD were transferred there. But Reichel’s documents didn’t say anything about what will come after capturing Voronezh. One could either turn south to the Caucasus or (what Stavka feared the most) go north, enveloping Moscow from the east. In any case there was not much time left to massively strengthen South-Western direction to make it able to repel the strike of AG “South”, prepared for many months long. And Reichel’s incident was not the only one. In almost the same time Soviet 48 A commander Samokhin accidentally (or not?) landed on a German airfield instead of the Soviet, was captured prisoner and told lots of valuable information about Bryansk Front defences.
One thing is clear: Germans are going to attack and very likely capture even more Soviet ground. But what about already occupied areas? There is one more Nazi crime against humanity which I forgot to mention in the previous part of the lecture: Ostarbeiter, “workers from the East”. Germans lacked labour due to mass conscription to the Wehrmacht, so they decided to replace German workers with free labour from occupied countries, mostly occupied parts of USSR. This was also a part of a longer programme of colonisation of Eastern Europe and making “non-Aryan” people slaves of the “higher race”.
In January 1942 occupation administration began agitation for work in Germany. But the number of volunteers wasn’t high, very soon Germans had to deport Soviet citizens by millions, without asking for their will. Ostarbeiters were severely limited in their rights. Majority of them lived in special labour camps, separated from local civilians. Living conditions were horrible, half of the food consisted of waste. Since 1943 Nazis used even 10 years old children as forced labour. There were special concentration camps for children, for example in Auschwitz-Birkenau. “Elimination through work” – maximal exploitation of an Ostarbeiter until he dies from hunger, illnesses and exhaustion was a common practice on Third Reich’s factories. Only 15 000 deported young women worked as servants in German families, their lives were much easier. Another 5 million Ostarbeiters (2,4 million from Ukraine) were sentenced to immense suffering.
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Post by Deleted on Dec 9, 2021 19:51:54 GMT
good
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Dec 30, 2021 14:02:50 GMT
Part 7. Fall Blau (28.06.-18.11.1942)
7.1. Strike in the south
On 28th of June 1942, 4 PzA attacked left wing of Bryansk Front with 2 tank and 3 army corps. The offensive was prepared with an extremely heavy artillery strike. Major concentration of planes gave Germans uncontested air superiority for the next several days. Soviet 40 A and 13 A suffered a catastrophic defeat – Germans advanced up to 15 km already on the first day of the operation. Situation looked so bad that Stavka immediately decided to execute a counterattack with 3 fresh tank corps – 4th, 24th and 17th. These were united into Fedorenko’s operative group. Fedorenko’s group attacked, but it couldn’t make another “Raseinai” – unlike in 1941 Soviet tanks were now inferior to most of German self-propelled guns, tanks and anti-tank artillery. Long-barreled PzKpfw. IV and Pak-40 guns made even the “almighty” KVs vulnerable. Mass attack of heavy tanks couldn’t fix everything like it was last summer. Fedorenko’s counter-strike failed. On 30th of June, Paulus’ 6 A attacked further south. Its 1 tank and 3 army corps also immediately broke through. Already on 3rd of July, big part of Soviet 40th and 21st armies were encircled near Staryi Oskol. 24 PzD advanced in emptiness, crossed Don and broke through to Voronezh on 5th of July, motorised division “Großdeutschland” (“Great Germany”) captured another bridgehead over Don further north. Stavka believed it was a critical situation, because these bridgeheads could be used for further advance into the depth of Central Russia and maybe even on Moscow. Lizyukov’s 5 tank army (5 TA) was ordered to counterattack on German flanks to prevent this from happening. Tank armies were by then new units for the Red Army. A tank army originally contained 2 tank corps, a tank brigade, a rifle division, a 76-mm guns regiment and a rocket artillery regiment. If we add more heavy artillery to this unit, we’ll get an equivalent of a German tank corps. Lizyukov’s counterattack was a disaster. 5 TA fought hard many days long, but didn’t have any real headway. At least, it forced Germans to leave 24 PzK on their northern flank for several days, while tank units were needed to go south and encircle South-Western and Southern Fronts. This delay was so critical for Fall Blau that Hitler fired AG “South” commander F. von Bock (officially because of “weak health”, but in reality due to the situation around Voronezh) on 13th of July. The city of Voronezh itself was also contested by the Red Army. Stavka formed Voronezh Front under N.F. Vatutin from 3rd, 5th and 6th Reserve Armies to halt German advance to the east, but in reality these reserves were more needed in the south, where Germans turned their 4 PzA and 6 A. Lizyukov will continue to execute numerous counterattacks until 25th of July, when he went into another desperate attack in person and got killed in his KV-tank. On 6th of July Southern and South-Western Fronts were ordered to withdraw, because of serious threat on their right (northern) flank. Germans started pursuing them with 1 PzA. Together with 4 PzA in the north it now attempted to catch them in a large pocket. But Soviet forces retreated in order and didn’t let the enemy tank units to link up for a long time. Both Tank Armies will meet near Millerovo only on 15th of July, catching no more than 5 divisions – this success looked miserable in comparison to German plans of destroying 2 Soviet Fronts north of Don. After Millerovo cauldron South-Western and Southern Fronts retreated in different directions. The first one got 3 reserve armies and was renamed to Stalingrad Front, with his main goal being defence of Stalingrad direction, Timoshenko was relieved from command over it; Southern Front tried to hold on Lower Don together with 51 A from the North-Caucasian Front. On 28th of July SF will become a part of North-Caucasian Front itself. The defence on Lower Don wasn’t well-prepared and manned. On 16th of July, 22 PzD captured a bridgehead over Don in Pereboynoe. By 19th of July, Germans concentrated 22 PzD and 14 PzD and attacked with them south. This breakthrough forced defending Soviets to abandon Lower Don. On 25th of July, 17 A occupied Rostov-on-Don. The way to Caucasus lay open – North-Caucasian Front couldn’t hold the line in open steppe while Germans enjoyed a clear advantage in numbers. 
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 10, 2022 19:17:45 GMT
I'm still alive
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 10, 2022 19:19:03 GMT
7.2. “No step back!” – of NKVD and blocking units
NKVD is one of the “black myths” of GPW. People often believe that NKVD executed Soviet soldiers and commanders by hundreds of thousands and created overall atmosphere of fear, making Red Army servicemen follow any mad order from Stavka. Reality is, as usual, more complex and interesting.
NKVD (НКВД, Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел, People’s Commissariat of the Interior) wasn’t only engaged in political repressions, but also protected state border, railway lines, important plants and factories, captured foreign agents and gathered intelligence.
Interior and border forces of NKVD numbered 341 500 men in 1941. NKVD border guards were the first to meet German attack on 22nd of June 1941. They fought heroically, giving precious time for Army to deploy. NKVD railway guard servicemen were last to leave the encircled Kiev in September 1941. And it was the 10th NKVD division under general Sarayev’s command, which, together with anti-aircraft forces and militia, stopped first attacks on Stalingrad in August 1942. These are only a few of numerous episodes during GPW, when NKVD fought in the first line.
First NKVD blocking detachments were organised already on 24th of June 1941, their task was to fight off German agents, saboteurs and paratroopers. First blocking unit with “classical” tasks (arrest of retreating soldiers) were formed by Borisov’s garrison commander I.Z. Susaykin in July 1941. They stopped soldiers retreating from the Minsk cauldron and added them to the garrison. Susaykin’s blocking detachments were subordinated to the Army command and so independent from NKVD.
Systematic formation of blocking detachments under NKVD leadership began on 28th of July 1942, during the retreat after heavy Soviet defeats in operation “Blau”, when Stalin issued People’s Commissar of Defence Order №227, later unofficially called “No step back!” In this document Stalin prohibited further retreat and ordered organisation of 3-5 blocking units (600-1000 men total) and 1-3 penal battalions (800-2400 men total) on each front. Blocking units had to stop retreating soldiers and either return to the frontline or arrest them. Some of the arrested were sent to penal battalions to “redeem the guilt to Motherland” (quote from order №227) through service on the most dangerous parts of the frontline. After the redemption soldier could return to normal army units.
In July-October 1942, blocking detachments of Don, Stalingrad and South-Eastern Fronts stopped 140 755 retreating soldiers, arrested 3 980 of them, sent 2 961 to penal battalions and penal companies, executed 1 189 and returned the rest (131 094) to the frontline. As we can see the majority of retreaters were returned to the fight without any punishment and just 0,8% of them were shot. Soviet Ministry of Defence documentation, which was declassified in 2007, obviously says nothing about blocking units forcing Soviet soldiers to attack with massive machine gun fire and we can throw such tales into a rubbish bin.
Blocking detachments will be liquidated after Stalin’s order №0349, issued on 29th of October 1944: there was no more a need of them during victorious offensives in the end of the war. Penal battalions continued to exist until the Victory; 427 910 men went through them in 1942-1945.
P.S.: I’m not trying to deny NKVD’s role in Soviet crimes against own people or praise the repressive organs, but to explain NKVD’s share in the victory over Nazism. Soviet anti-retreat measures were sometimes very harsh, but critical situation for the country and its people didn’t leave any other option.
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Post by Gerd von Rundstedt on Jan 13, 2022 19:42:26 GMT
alexandrvasilevski, I am going to have to disagree with you on one facet of the NKVD section. I find it highly doubtful that orders not to retreat assisted the Soviet Union in WW2. A full retreat to a previously fortified location would be what would seem to be the best way to stop the German onslaught, along with helping partisans working behind German lines, making a trench system out of the Eastern Front while they wait to simply outproduce the Germans. I see no reason (other than possibly the railways) why the Soviet Union needed such a westward frontline.
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Post by Manfred von Richthofen on Jan 14, 2022 0:44:05 GMT
7.2. “No step back!” – of NKVD and blocking units
NKVD is one of the “black myths” of GPW. People often believe that NKVD executed Soviet soldiers and commanders by hundreds of thousands and created overall atmosphere of fear, making Red Army servicemen follow any mad order from Stavka. Reality is, as usual, more complex and interesting. NKVD (НКВД, Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел, People’s Commissariat of the Interior) wasn’t only engaged in political repressions, but also protected state border, railway lines, important plants and factories, captured foreign agents and gathered intelligence. Interior and border forces of NKVD numbered 341 500 men in 1941. NKVD border guards were the first to meet German attack on 22nd of June 1941. They fought heroically, giving precious time for Army to deploy. NKVD railway guard servicemen were last to leave the encircled Kiev in September 1941. And it was the 10th NKVD division under general Sarayev’s command, which, together with anti-aircraft forces and militia, stopped first attacks on Stalingrad in August 1942. These are only a few of numerous episodes during GPW, when NKVD fought in the first line. First NKVD blocking detachments were organised already on 24th of June 1941, their task was to fight off German agents, saboteurs and paratroopers. First blocking unit with “classical” tasks (arrest of retreating soldiers) were formed by Borisov’s garrison commander I.Z. Susaykin in July 1941. They stopped soldiers retreating from the Minsk cauldron and added them to the garrison. Susaykin’s blocking detachments were subordinated to the Army command and so independent from NKVD. Systematic formation of blocking detachments under NKVD leadership began on 28th of July 1942, during the retreat after heavy Soviet defeats in operation “Blau”, when Stalin issued People’s Commissar of Defence Order №227, later unofficially called “No step back!” In this document Stalin prohibited further retreat and ordered organisation of 3-5 blocking units (600-1000 men total) and 1-3 penal battalions (800-2400 men total) on each front. Blocking units had to stop retreating soldiers and either return to the frontline or arrest them. Some of the arrested were sent to penal battalions to “redeem the guilt to Motherland” (quote from order №227) through service on the most dangerous parts of the frontline. After the redemption soldier could return to normal army units. In July-October 1942, blocking detachments of Don, Stalingrad and South-Eastern Fronts stopped 140 755 retreating soldiers, arrested 3 980 of them, sent 2 961 to penal battalions and penal companies, executed 1 189 and returned the rest (131 094) to the frontline. As we can see the majority of retreaters were returned to the fight without any punishment and just 0,8% of them were shot. Soviet Ministry of Defence documentation, which was declassified in 2007, obviously says nothing about blocking units forcing Soviet soldiers to attack with massive machine gun fire and we can throw such tales into a rubbish bin. Blocking detachments will be liquidated after Stalin’s order №0349, issued on 29th of October 1944: there was no more a need of them during victorious offensives in the end of the war. Penal battalions continued to exist until the Victory; 427 910 men went through them in 1942-1945. P.S.: I’m not trying to deny NKVD’s role in Soviet crimes against own people or praise the repressive organs, but to explain NKVD’s share in the victory over Nazism. Soviet anti-retreat measures were sometimes very harsh, but critical situation for the country and its people didn’t leave any other option. No Step Back DLC |
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 16, 2022 7:40:01 GMT
alexandrvasilevski , I am going to have to disagree with you on one facet of the NKVD section. I find it highly doubtful that orders not to retreat assisted the Soviet Union in WW2. A full retreat to a previously fortified location would be what would seem to be the best way to stop the German onslaught, along with helping partisans working behind German lines, making a trench system out of the Eastern Front while they wait to simply outproduce the Germans. I see no reason (other than possibly the railways) why the Soviet Union needed such a westward frontline. I am glad to hear objections, a discussion is the actual purpose of this thread. OK, so you find the Red Army should have retreated in 1941 to a defensive position and sit there in a trench system. But because of geography of Eastern Europe the shortest defensive line for USSR would be... on its western border. Any retreat actually made the defensive front longer, which is a bad thing in any defence. And the most important point: military theory and practice just don't let any chances for success in a defence "a-la Great War" on a 5000-8000 km long frontline in 1940s. Going to a passive defence means completely losing strategic initiative to your enemy, who now can concentrate any force on any direction and break a hole in your defence whenever he wants. A defender must stretch out his forces along the whole frontline with equal concentration, not knowing where the next strike will come (intelligence is not going to help a lot), while the attacker can mass up troops. Yes, in WW1 a passive defence worked. But times have changed. Already in late-WW1 fighting sides developped means of breaking any field defence, but incoming reserves of the enemy managed to block he holes in the frontline. But in WW2 a new powerful mean of warfare - tank divisions/corps/groups/armies were invented, and they are able to exploit the breakthrough before enemy reserves arrive. A perfect example of Red Army trying to defend passively on a long front is the beginning of the Battle for Moscow. Western, Reserve and Bryansk Fronts developped a pretty good field defence for almost 2 months (August-September 1941) and also built a rear Rzhev-Vyazma defensive line. But their passive position after 10th of September allowed Germans to secretly mass up 3 Tank Groups (75% of Panzerwaffe's strength in the East!) and to strike on unexpected directions, which ended up in most of the Soviet troops being encircled and destroyed near Vyazma and Bryansk. Another example of an even better prepared Soviet defence being breached by Germans is the so-called "Stalin's line". There were plans in summer 1941 to retreat to it and to try to hold off German attacks along it. "Stalin's line" was a line of pillboxes constructed in 1937-1939 and Soviet generals hoped it can be a decisive factor in stopping the Germans. While Western Front was encircled and coudn't retreat to the "Stalin's line", South-Western Front retreated mostly intact. But Germans still managed to break through the line within several days. German artillery and assault groups made every Soviet field defence penetrable. Therefore, I don't see any defensive line, on which the Red Army could bring your vision of the war to life. The only possible way to win was to contest every chunk of land with conterattacks to gain the strategic initative. And regarding the order №227: it was actually against retreat on tactical level. Essential retreats on higher, operative level, such as the retreat of North-Caucasian Front to Caucasus mountains in August 1942 were still approved by Stavka. |
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 16, 2022 13:01:43 GMT
7.3. Battle for Caucasus
3 Soviet armies (37th, 12th and 18th), which retreated southwards from Don, numbered less than 100 000 men with 96 guns in artillery regiments and a handful of battalion guns and mortars. Long retreat decreased the number of artillery of the front facing main German blow below any norms. Meanwhile 47 A guarded Black and Azov Sea coasts, unaware of the fact that Germans cancelled 11 Army’s landing in this area and transferred most of it to Leningrad, so guarding the coast was actually pointless. Nazis had 3 field armies (1 PzA, 17 A, 3 Rom. A) with at least twice as many soldiers and 4 500 artillery pieces and mortars. They had 8 tank and motorised divisions at disposal – at the same time North-Caucasian Front didn’t have a single one substantive tank unit. In these conditions North-Caucasian Front commander S.M. Budyonniy proposed a withdrawal to Caucasian mountains and river Terek, where one could successfully defend even with small forces. Despite the order № 227, Stalin realised the necessity of such decision and approved Budyonnyi’s plan. But the retreat wasn’t an easy task as one might think. Germans had 2 Tank Armies, capable of breaking through to the Soviet rear, cutting off escape routes of Soviet units or even completely encircling them. 37 A was flanked both from east and west already in the very first days of the retreat and slightly escaped to Stavropol (Voroshilovsk). Its fast retreat opened the right (eastern) flank of 12 A and 18 A and they were forced to withdraw to Krasnodar. By the end of July situation improved a bit, because 4 PzA had to turn northeast and help 6 A with its drive on Stalingrad, so it no longer participated in the Battle for Caucasus. Another halt to the German drive came when retreating Soviets blew up the dam of Veselovo reservoir on river Manych on 27th of July. Soviet command also executed a counterstroke on German flank: left wing of 51 A (1 rifle, 1 cavalry division and 2 tank brigades) tried to cut off the railway line supplying 1 PzA, though failing to achieve this goal. Meanwhile Germans neared their goals – Caucasian oilfields. One of them was situated in Maykop. On 7th of August, the famous Brandenburgers (for those, who didn’t read previous chapters: Brandenburger Regiment 800 was a special unit in Wehrmacht, its servicemen spoke Russian and wore Soviet uniform to capture important objects in Soviet rear, mainly bridges, without anyone realising that they are enemies) took a bridge over Belaya near Maykop and let German tanks attack the town. But Soviet soldiers fought bravely, defending Maykop two days long and gaining time to sabotage local oil facilities. (SPOILER: Germans won’t be able to restore them for the whole period of occupation). But after the fall of Maykop another danger appeared. 1 PzA was now near to the Black Sea coast. Once it would reach it, all Soviet troops defending on the line from Temryuk to Tuapse would be cut off and left to die without enough supplies (Black Sea Fleet wasn’t able to successfully supply them under constant German air raids, remember just how difficult it was in June in Sevastopol). Fortunately, 1 PzA turned east to capture oilfields in Groznyi and Baku. The drive to Black Sea became infantry’s task, and it couldn’t exploit breakthroughs as fast as tanks can do. 17 A tried to advance on Tuapse until 18th of August, when ever-growing Soviet resistance forced it to stop the attacks. During this time, left flank of North-Caucasian Front retreated to less vulnerable positions near Novorossiysk, though not without troubles: several thousand Marines slightly escaped from Taman peninsula via Black Sea Fleet ships when land retreat routes were cut off. 1 PzA’s advance also wasn’t great. Thing is, that the whole AG “A” (Nazi forces in Caucasus) got supplies through logistic bottleneck of Dnieper and Don crossings and through nearly road-less steppes. That’s why essential resources couldn’t be brought in time, resulting in 3 PzK staying without fuel for several days. After fuel arrived, 1 PzA began to capture bridgeheads over Terek. On 1st of September, it captured one and on 14th – another bridgehead. During next days 13 PzD managed to unite these bridgeheads, but constant Soviet counterassaults didn’t let it advance on Groznyi. On its right (western) flank German mountain troops (“Gebirgsjäger”) captured some mountain passes over Main Caucasian Ridge. Their success threatened Georgia and supply routes of 56 A and 37 A. Stavka couldn’t accept this and Budyonnyi was fired from front command. On 11th of September, his North-Caucasian Front was reorganised to Black Sea Group of Transcaucasian Front. But the situation with Caucasian passes dissatisfied not only Stalin, but at the same time Hitler. He didn’t like the way W. List coordinated operations of AG “A”, so, on 9th of September, he fired List and … became AG “A” commander in person! Of course such dissolved command (Hitler couldn’t pay enough attention to the Army Group while being busy with politics and overall command of Armed Forces) didn’t work well for further German actions in the region. 17 A advanced on Tuapse throughout the whole autumn 1942, but retreated to original positions after heavy fights. Situation developed in a similar way to the east – on the German bridgehead over Terek. On 25th of October, 1 PzA renewed its offensive. On 27th it occupied Nalchik. Thus it cut off a big part of 37 A, because mountains behind it were considered impassable both for supply trucks and for retreating soldiers. But Soviet soldiers did another unbelievable thing along with many others in this war: on 7th-16th of November, cut off divisions escaped through high mountains (up to 3 798 m in this area) in late autumn (mountains were covered with deep snow and frosts became severe) to the other side of Caucasus, saving themselves from elimination in a specific “pocket”, where high mountains build a part of encirclement ring. 13 PzD and 23 PzD now advanced on Ordzhonikidze, nearing oilfields. But Soviet command managed to concentrate 3 rifle and 4 tank brigades on the enemy’s flanks. On 6th of November, they attacked and semi-encircled 23 PzD and 13 PzD – they were connected to other units by a 3 km wide corridor. On 11th of November, both tank divisions escaped through this corridor, though it was anything but an organised retreat: 140 (mostly broken) tanks, 70 artillery pieces, 183 motorcycles and 2 350 vehicles became Red Army trophies. 1 PzA was no more capable of continuing its run for oil. 
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 21, 2022 15:01:46 GMT
7.4. Defence of Stalingrad
Occupation of Caucasus wasn’t the only way to leave USSR without oil. Caucasian region was connected with the main part of the country via water through Caspian Sea and Volga and via land through the railway lines. Both ways went through Stalingrad, which made potential loss of it a catastrophe for the Soviets: oil wouldn’t be able to be transported from Baku and Groznyi to all of the Soviet regions north of Stalingrad – 80% of the frontline. Another reason for Germans to advance on Stalingrad was to complete their “Don line”, covering communications of the Caucasian AG “A”. They couldn’t leave it with a flank lying in open steppes. In the same time, Stalingrad was important because of it numerous plants and factories, especially the Stalingrad Tractor Plant (Сталинградский тракторный завод, СТЗ, STZ), which produced tractors for Soviet artillery and T-34 tanks, “Barrikady” («Баррикады», Barricades), which produced 203-mm B-4 howitzers and “Krasnyi Oktyabr” («Красный Октябрь», Red October), which produced a lot of steel. Giving up such a major industrial centre wasn’t an option. Soviets began fortifying the city already in 1941! On 23rd of July 1942, OKW issued Directive № 45, introducing operation “Braunschweig” against Stalingrad. In fact heavy fighting on Stalingrad direction already went on for several days. Battle of Stalingrad officially started on 17th of July with first fights between the German 6th A and Stalingrad Front vanguards in the big Don river bend. But historians A. Isaev and A. Chunikhin found evidences of first clashes as early as on 15th and 16th of July. How did it all look like? Overly optimistic 6 A soldiers advanced through vast steppes without contacting the enemy and were sure that Soviet reserves are all gone, that the coming battle for Stalingrad will be an easy walk and then suddenly 3 Soviet reserve armies appeared: Kuznetsov’s 63rd (former 5th Reserve) took positions along Don, Kolpakchi’s 62nd (former 7th Reserve) and Chuikov’s (who’s about to become really famous) 64th (former 1st Reserve) Armies blocked off the Don river bend. Small groups of both 6 A and Soviet reserve armies immediately began fierce fighting, waiting for their rear-guards to pull up. After gathering enough forces Germans began to execute following plan: 14 PzK and 8 AC attacked in the north on Kalach-on-Don, aiming for crossings over Middle Don; 51 AC and 24 PzK were to strike further south, turn to Kalach-on-Don and link up with the northern group, encircling Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies. By 25th of July, 14 TC broke through to Don, though failing to capture any river crossings and encircled 2 Soviet divisions and a tank brigade. The latter were united to the so-called Zhuravlёv’s group. Southern striking group faced a denser Soviet front and didn’t make such a good headway. Newly formed Soviet 1st and 4th Tank Armies got orders to counterattack 14 PzK. 1 TA has immediately seen some success, pushing German tanks away from Kalach-on-Don and relieving Zhuravlёv’s group from its encirclement. 4 TA began to counterattack a bit later and also stopped the Germans in its area. But Soviet losses in tanks were extremely high. German anti-tank facilities were as developed as never before: new tanks, assault guns and Pak-40 anti-tank artillery effectively pierced Soviet armour. After all the fighting, Fourth TA was so exhausted, that its soldiers ironically called it “a four-tanks-strong-army”. Heavy fighting in the Don river bend slowed down 6 A’s advance in such scale, that German High Command decided to return 4 PzA north to help it, instead of using it in the Caucasus as was originally planned. On 2nd of August, it captured Kotelnikovo station, deeply flanking Soviet Stalingrad Front. The manoeuver of 4 PzA was so unexpected for the Soviets, that German tankers advanced 150 km in one day – an uncontested record of blitzkrieg! But after 57 A pulled up from the rear, 4 PzA’s advance was stopped near Abganerovo. Hoth’s tanks failed to break into the city of Stalingrad. Meanwhile on 5th of August, Stalingrad Front was divided in two – South-Eastern Front under A. Yerёmenko on Kotelnikovo direction and Stalingrad Front to its north. The latter will immediately suffer a defeat – on 8th of August striking groups of 6 A closed the cauldron for the Soviet 62nd Army west of Kalach-on-Don. 28 000 Soviet soldiers were caught in this encirclement. They continued heavy resistance until 15th of August. 6 A used this success and captured a bridgehead over Don. On 23rd of August, 14 PzK broke through and advanced to Volga to the north of Stalingrad, forming a 60 km long and 8 km wide corridor. Its 16 PzD tried to occupy the city itself, but was stopped by the 1077th anti-air artillery regiment. In the same time Luftwaffe bombed the city. Only 100 000 of 400 000 city inhabitants were evacuated by then, so civilian casualties were very high. More than 40 000 of them died. Soviet tanks of the 23 TC drove through the whole burning city to stop the Germans. It all surely looked as an apocalyptic scene. Stalingrad Front’s counterstrokes on 23rd of August- 2nd of September nearly cut off 14 PzK’s communications – it had to be supplied per an air bridge. 4 PzA pressed on defenders of Stalingrad from south, threatening their communications and forcing them to retreat to a shorter front of defence. Soviet retreat widened 14 PzK’s corridor, solving its problems with supplies. But Soviet command still wanted to continue the counterassaults, so it transferred another 2 reserve armies (8th and 9th Reserve Armies, which became 66th and 24th Armies respectively) to the area north of Stalingrad. These forces immediately began offensive action. 6 A commander Paulus decided to defeat poorly supplied (its only supply lines went through ferries on Volga, which constantly suffered from German bombardment) 62 A in Stalingrad and then turn his main forces north to repel Soviet attacks and secure the defensive line on Don. But while Paulus threw his forces against defenders of Stalingrad, his weak flank covered by Italian troops already got serious problems. Soviet 21 A crossed Don and captured a big bridgehead in Serafimovich. Italians tried to liquidate this bridgehead with all available means, even with a cavalry charge (!), but didn’t succeed. In September Italians were replaced by the 3rd Romanian Army with an even lower fighting value, so liquidation of the bridgehead came out of question. More than that, Soviets even managed to capture another bridgehead in Kletskaya. Both bridgeheads will become good starting points for Soviet counteroffensive later, in November. German inability to react adequately on the threat posed by Serafimovich and Kletskaya bridgeheads broke the pretty good idea to defend leaning on Don river frontier. The Don defensive line now had two big and barely covered gaps. But German main attack seemed to go on well. When V.I. Chuikov became 62nd Army’s commander on 12th of September, he found his unit on verge of a catastrophe. 6 A pressed hard on Stalingrad, capturing Mamayev Kurgan, 192m high hill, overlooking the city, on 14th and on the next day it linked up with Hoth’s 4 PzA. Situation was saved by the arrival of general Rodimtsev’s 13th guards rifle division and 137th tank brigade. They recaptured outskirts of Mamayev Kurgan and stabilised Soviet defences again. By 4th of October, Germans however arrived to “Red October” and “Barricades” factories, ruins of which were stiffly defended by Chuikov’s troops. The only way to save 62 A from total destruction was to continue pressing on 6th Army’s northern flank. On 26th of September, Stalingrad Front began another offensive against 14 PzK, but lack of advanced assault tactics prevented Soviet forces from achieving any major success. The assault still worked as a major distraction of German forces. Once the offensive stopped, 14 PzK reorganised and encircled Gorokhov’s group (mainly 115th rifle and 2nd motorised brigades, 6 500 men together with other units of the group) north-west of Stalingrad, worsening Chuikov’s positions. On 14th of October, Paulus consolidated his forces and began a new offensive in Stalingrad, larger than any before. Soviet 62nd and 64th Armies fought for every house, every factory building. Both sides massively used snipers, flamethrowers and other specific means of urban fights. Chuikov’s tactics was to stick very near to German positions to make them not using big guns to avoid friendly fire. Meanwhile Soviet dive bombers (among them the famous 588th night bombers regiment with female pilots, who were called “Night witches” by German soldiers) mastered the air at night and caused major damage to German positions with their precise bombing from little height. Sometimes, Germans constructed false positions to deceive Chuikov’s close contact tactics, but in most cases it proved itself to be effective. On 20th of October, Rokossovskiy’s Don Front (former Stalingrad Front, renamed on 1st of October; Yerёmenko’s South-Eastern became the name “Stalingrad Front” instead) began an offensive of its own. Its goal was to link up with Chuikov and encircle German troops in the city. 1st guards Army advanced a bit, but failed to install connection with 62nd Army. The front didn’t lack artillery, but infantry wasn’t trained and experienced enough to fight self-sufficient assault action, it basically relied on the popular disbelief “artillery destroys, infantry captures”. Lack of assault groups will be a big problem of the Red Army for the next several months. Don Front’s operation still had a great impact on the course of battle and inflicted heavy casualties to the enemy. In fact Don Front, though being overlooked in historiography, numbered 200 000 men – far more than 60 000 city defenders, and thus led fighting on a much bigger scale. Not only Rokossovskiy’s offensive, but also the arrival of Lyudnikov’s 138th rifle division from 64 A to 62 A slowed down Paulus’ advance. Lyudnikov took positions in the “Barricades” factory, Gorokhov’s group broke free from its encirclement and held positions in the northern part of the city, the front stabilised. But the most dramatic fights are yet to come! By the beginning of November floating ice made Volga hardly passable for supply boats and the supply situation of 62 A became really bad. Germans compressed 138 RD to an isolated 700m*400m bridgehead, called “Lyudnikov’s island” and chose the destruction of it as their primary objective. And with 138 RD barely getting any supplies since 14th of November they were in position to achieve it. Lyudnikov’s men fought heroically, they couldn’t be supplied, but friendly forces on the other side of Volga still supported them with artillery fire. 138 RD held its bridgehead until 19th of November, when Soviets began their major counteroffensive and Germans stopped all attacks on Stalingrad. But that’s another story… 
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 26, 2022 14:33:08 GMT
7.5. Summer-autumn fighting for RzhevThough operation “Kremlin” was a fake, Western strategic direction wasn’t silent in summer 1942. Germans wanted to destroy all of the Soviet salients in the region, Soviets were willing to expand them, especially the Sukhinichi bulge. Germans were first to launch their offensive, called operation “Seydlitz”. Its goal was to encircle and destroy Soviet bulge near Kholm-Zhirkovskiy, held by Maslennikov’s 39 A and Sokolov’s 11 CC (60 000 men total). German command worried about these forces because of their extreme closeness to 9th Army’s vital communications: Smolensk-Vyazma and Vyazma-Rzhev railways. On 2nd of July, Esebeck Group from Belyi and 23 AC together with von der Meden’s cavalry brigade attacked the narrow (28 km wide) corridor connecting Soviet bulge with other Kalinin Front units. I’d like to say more about Meden’s cavalry brigade. Wehrmacht had by now only 1 cavalry division and it was transformed into 24 PzD in November 1941. Cavalry brigade had to be formed in spring 1942, when first operational plans of “Seydlitz” were issued. Cavalry was found suitable for a use in dense forests and swamps between Olenino and Belyi – a region, where tanks lose to horsemen in mobility. Meden’s brigade was constructed of 7 horsemen and 6 cyclist squadrons supported by 14 tanks. German advance was at first pretty slow, but cavalry manoeuvers allowed them to bypass and to force to retreat some stiffly defending Soviet groups and to finally complete the cauldron on 5th of July. 46 PzK (2 infantry and 1 tank division) stroke west, cutting the cauldron in two. Large groups of Soviet soldiers began to break free, fighting until the end. On 13th of July, Germans declared their victory in the battle and capturing of 30 000 POWs, but in reality fights continued until 23rd of July. Several thousand Soviet soldiers escaped from the encirclement, but they had to abandon hundreds of artillery pieces, tanks and trucks and lost positions which threatened important German communications. While Kalinin Front suffered a big defeat, Western Front tried to achieve a local success in the Sukhinichi bulge. On 6th of July, 16 A began an operation to encircle and defeat a part of 2 PzA near Zhizdra. The army advanced several kilometres on the first day of the offensive and put 10 TC to the frontline on 7th of July. But it still didn’t achieve a breakthrough. Activity of Luftwaffe grew every day and finally forced 16 A to stop its offensive in the middle of July. Even after operation “Seydlitz” Soviets still had a salient, which threatened a vital German communication: Toropets bulge was very close to Minsk-Smolensk railway, supplying most of the AG “Centre”. A move south from this salient could have catastrophic consequences for German 9 A, 4 A and 3 PzA. But Soviets were unable to concentrate a big striking force and to effectively supply it, because of no railways or motorways connecting it with “the big ground”: Moscow-Rzhev-Velikie Luki railway was blocked by German bridgehead in Rzhev. Therefore Stavka decided to liberate Rzhev by Western and Kalinin Fronts, de-block the railway, concentrate large forces in the Toropets bulge and finally cut off AG “Centre” from supplies. Meanwhile, Germans prepared their own offensives: “Wirbelwind” (“Tornado”) – encircling Sukhinichi and “Vogelhaus” (Birdhouse”) – encirclement of the Toropets bulge with attacks from Rzhev and Demyansk salients. On 30th of July, 30 A of the Kalinin Front attacked positions of German 256 ID and 87 ID north of Rzhev. Artillery barrage was massive, on the first day 30 A advanced up to 7 km, almost breaking through the enemy’s front. 6 km were left to Rzhev. Operation seemed to be a success. But then Germans transferred their reserve – 6 ID – to the attacked part of the frontline and manned defensive positions in Polunino, Galakhovo and Timofeevo (defensive facilities there were built several months long) with it. 30th Army’s advance came to a halt. Zhukov wanted his Western Front to join the offensive on 2nd of August, but heavy rains disturbed his preparations. 31 A and 20 A attacked 2 days later than planned. Pogoreloye Gorodishche was liberated on the first day of the offensive, German front was breached, 20 A advanced 30 km in just 2 days, infantry moved so fast that its artillery got stuck in mud far behind the frontline. But 9 A commander Model already transferred his whole mobile reserve: 1st, 2nd and 5th tank divisions – to the frontline. 9 A wasn’t anymore able of supporting 2 PzA’s operation “Wirbelwind” against Sukhinichi: all mobile unts were occupied with solving the crisis near Rzhev. And of course no one even thought now about the major “Vogelhaus”. On 6th of August, Western Front deployed its mobile group (6 TC, 8 TC, 2nd guards CC). Its task was to capture Sychёvka, cutting off the only supply line of defenders of Rzhev and forcing them to retreat. But well-fortified strongpoint in Karmanovo on the left flank of the group threatened it with encirclement and Soviet command didn’t risk and decided rather to capture Karmanovo first and continue the advance later. But Germans now re-stored a dense front and Soviet offensive came to a stalemate – Karmanovo will be liberated only on 23rd of August. While Soviet offensive stopped gaining ground, though bringing heavy casualties to both sides, AG “Centre” tried to retake the initiative by eliminating Sukhinichi bulge. Operation “Wirbelwind” had to be done in a lesser variant, with only one pincer of attack – the southern one. 2 PzA began the offensive on 11th of August. On the first day it achieved a big success, advancing 25 km and encircling 3 Soviet divisions. 1st guards CC and 10 TC, freshly replenished after previous heavy fighting, were brought in by the Soviets to repel the attack. By 14th of August, 2 PzA was stopped and the encircled Soviet divisions escaped the cauldron mostly intact. After the successful defence, Soviets decided to counterattack and encircle 2 PzA’s striking group. 3 TA (12 TC, 15 TC, 1st guards MRD, 154 RD, 264 RD, 179th separate TB) was deployed to help 16 A and 61 A with this objective. On 22nd of August, the offensive began. But despite large concentration of force it didn’t achieve a breakthrough. German striking group had 9 divisions on a pretty narrow front, and so, regarding Soviet problems with assault tactics, it was enough to stop Soviet offensive and to prevent a defeat. In early September, stalemate set again on the whole Sukhinichi salient. Meanwhile, Soviet 5 A and 33 A attacked Gzhatsk, half the way between Sukhinichi and Rzhev. They achieved some local success, but the most weight of the battle now lay on the Kalinin Front. Its forces crossed Volga on 29th of August, on 21st of September it finally reached the town of Rzhev itself. Fierce street fighting began at once. Germans deployed the elite motorised division “Großdeutschland” (“Great Germany”) to stop the Soviet advance. They managed to do it and in the beginning of October Soviets stopped executing Rzhev-Sychёvka operation. Casualties of both sides were very high: 9 A lost 50 000 – 60 000 men dead, injured, captured prisoner, Western and Kalinin Fronts lost up to 5 times more. Reasons for such high casualties are obvious: Germans won artillery duel, firing 2-3 times more artillery shells than the Red Army, they leaned on well-prepared fortifications and had numerous mobile reserves. Soviets were yet to learn assault tactics and breaching well-constructed defensive lines. But in this catastrophic meatgrinder, in this never-ending suffering of soldiers Red Army gained experience, which it will use in successful 1943-1945 offensives. 
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 29, 2022 19:33:58 GMT
7.6. Sinyavino operation
What happened to triumphant 11 A under Erich von Manstein? What did he do while Kleist and Paulus gained new victories in the Caucasus and near Stalingrad? After the siege of Sevastopol 11 A had to land in Kuban and assist in German move in the Caucasus. But then plans were changed. A part of 11th Army units were given to AG “A”, but 30 AC, siege artillery and army staff were transferred as far as to Leningrad. OKW wanted to use Manstein’s assault capacities to occupy Leningrad, shortening the frontline of AG “North” and freeing hundreds of thousand soldiers for other tasks. I personally find that the use of 11 A in Fall Blau would be a wiser decision for Germans, but OKW was clearly too self-confident to think of Fall Blau’s possible failure. 11 A had to cross Neva, cut Leningrad off from the “Road of life” going through Ladoga Sea and then attack the city together with the Finnish army. This operation was called “Nordlicht” (“Aurora borealis”) and its beginning was set on 14th of September 1942. Soviet Volkhov Front, however, also planned offensive action. 2nd Shock Army was formed again and was about to get one of the most important roles in coming operation with goal to de-block Leningrad. This time Soviet command learned from previous failure and planned to reach the besieged city through a much shorter route – only 16 km long. Not only 2nd Shock, but also 8th Army and its reserve in form of the 4th guards rifle corps participated in the offensive, which began on 27th of August, earlier than “Nordlicht”. None of the sides discovered the enemy’s plans: Germans were caught by surprise by the Soviet offensive and Soviets didn’t know anything about the arrival of 11 A. Manstein cancelled offensive plans for the time being and began to deploy his arriving units in a defensive battle. Germans fortified their positions since last autumn, but huge concentration of Soviet artillery (60 guns and mortars on 1 km of the frontline) and assault groups (it was the first case of their massive organisation in the Red Army) allowed 8 A to make headway. By 5th of September, it has crossed 2/3 of the way to Leningrad. Victory seemed to be near. 11 A divisions deployed one by one. On 29th of August, Manstein got 4 PzKpfw.V Tiger tanks – it was their first use on the battlefield. Well, actually these majestic giants failed to participate in any action on the first day, due to mechanical problems. In following days they began fighting, but didn’t achieve remarkable results because of small number and unfavourable terrain. Germans had to rely on more traditional means of warfare – on their experienced infantry and tank divisions, on their aviation and on their numerous heavy guns, brought up from Sevastopol. An offensive through forests around Sinyavino went on very slowly. Only on 25th of September, 11 A finally managed to encircle 2nd Shock Army. Manstein had to concentrate his whole heavy artillery against the cauldron. Gunfire was very fierce – big massifs of forests were completely destroyed. After stiff resistance, (in the end only 12 000 men from around 40 000 encircled were taken prisoner) of the 2nd Shock Army seized to exist by the beginning of October. Another Soviet attempt of de-blocking Leningrad failed. But German operation of final assault on the city was also cancelled because of high casualties, but even more important, because of high expense of heavy artillery shells, originally meant to be fired on the city defences, but instead used in Sinyavino forests. Manstein’s 11 Army staff was at first transferred to Velikie Luki, leaving most of its subordinate troops near Leningrad, but in December it will become AG “Don” staff and will be used on Stalingrad direction. The last realistic German opportunity of capturing Leningrad was gone, but the city still suffered under siege. Stavka began working on new plans of de-blockade of Leningrad. 
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 30, 2022 11:28:10 GMT
7.7. Kriegsmarine against Soviet-British communications: convoy PQ-17
During all of the mentioned battles USSR had to use large amounts of weapons, ammunition and other materiel. Its own industry was currently in a great crisis because of massive evacuation and connected issues, leading to lacks in quantity and quality of production, so any allied help was extremely valuable.
One of the most important ways of bringing this aid ran through the Arctic seas: from Great Britain around Scandinavia to Soviet ports in Murmansk and Archangelsk. However, it was also the most dangerous one, because German-occupied Norway was a perfect base for air force and ships intercepting Allied shipping on the route. Therefore 1942-1944 was a period of constant tactical, strategic and technical competition between lend-lease convoys trying to avoid contact with enemy’s planes, ships and U-boats or to repel their attacks if needed and German forces trying to take contact with the convoys and to destroy them.
In every special case scale in which the fighting sides fulfilled their objectives was different. First convoys (1941) have barely encountered ay opposition from German aviation and fleet. After the defeat near Moscow, Nazis deployed more resources against the supply route of USSR – its importance has increased after the failure of blitzkrieg. In January 1942, German U-boats sank first transports with lend-lease: “Vasiristan” and “Hurmatris”. In February, Allies led two convoys without losses.
In the beginning of March, Allies almost lost 2 convoys: PQ-12 from Britain to USSR and QP-8 returning from USSR to Britain. They were endangered by a large force of Kriegsmarine, led by the famous battleship “Tirpitz”. But, fortunately, due to intelligence issues, “Tirpitz” and other large ships missed both convoys by 60-80 miles and met only the stray Soviet timber carrier “Izhora”, which sent a radio message with coordinates of German ships, screwing up the secrecy of German operation. Heroic timber carrier tried to fight against gigantic war ships with its only one 37-mm gun and sank after an hour, together with its crew of 34 men. Forewarned Brits launched torpedo bombers from their aircraft carrier “Victorious”, forcing Germans to retreat, though not inflicting any damage to their ships. PQ-12 and QP-8 were saved.
Convoy PQ-13 had less luck: it lost 5 merchant ships of 19 in total. PQ-14 didn’t take heavy losses in shipping, but most of its vessels had to turn back to Britain because of unfavourable drifting ice situation. PQ-15 and PQ-16 went OK, losing 3 and 7 transports respectively, along with a destroyer and a submarine. But PQ-17 shocked the Allies.
On 27th of June 1942, a convoy of 35 transports under protection of 21 warships left Iceland for Archangelsk. Germans planned to intercept and destroy it in operation “Rösselsprung”, using aviation, U-boats and large ships. After first German disturbing attacks, on 4th of July, British Admiralty lord Pound ordered the convoy to dissipate, hoping that Germans won’t be able to find and destroy all ships. This decision was however a big mistake. Luftwaffe and U-boats attacked transports without anyone disturbing their activity – unprotected ships became extremely easy targets. A small group of transports travelled north and painted itself with white dye to hide amid Arctic ice. Later they managed to arrive to Archangelsk. Most of the other ships (22 transports!) were sunk by Germans. 153 men died, it was a real catastrophe. The whole PQ-17 supply run failed.
After this tragedy Brits sent only one convoy that summer – PQ-18. Then, Allies had to switch to small convoys running in the cover of polar night, which began in October. This new strategy worked far better. And now that evacuated Soviet industry began working in whole intensity, failures and successes in Arctic seas became less critical to USSR.
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Post by alexandrvasilevski on Jan 30, 2022 18:39:35 GMT
7.8. Conclusion
In summer 1942, Wehrmacht unexpectedly launched another strategic offensive with goals reaching as far as knocking out USSR from the war. Its economy, which incorporated all economies of continental Europe proved its ability to withstand the challenges of a war of attrition so far. Despite Soviet hopes, Germany did not only repel all Red Army attacks, but even went on another offensive and took a lot of ground.
Nevertheless, there were serious issues regarding “Fall Blau”. First of all, we see that it was executed only by the southern part of the Axis front, while last year Germans attacked on all directions. This decrease in scales is a real sign of Wehrmacht losing former strength. Then, though “Fall Blau” captured lots of ground, it didn’t achieve any strategic goals. 1 PzA stopped several hundred kilometres away from Caucasian oilfields. Oilfields in Maykop were sabotaged. Oil transport through Volga was surely interrupted, but 6 A didn’t have tight control of the city of Stalingrad, so they didn’t secure the prohibition of river transport on Volga, it could be restored after a Soviet field army-level counterattack.
On the other side of the frontline, USSR also found itself in a very threatened position. Even after the inspiring victory near Moscow (December 1941), the Army continued to retreat and to lose ground. Lost territory (Don steppes, Kuban, Northern Caucasus) possesses over fertile chernozem soil, so the region was really important for the land’s food supply. Occupation of this well-populated area also lessened Red Army’s mobilisation resource. If all this land would be liberated, new conscripts could be added to the military, not to mention how it would ease the suffering of systematically robbed, enslaved and starved to death civilian population of it.
Western Allies already missed the opportunity to open a second front in France this year. And, though USSR doesn’t know it, they are not really going to do it in 1943 either: Mediterranean strategy of invading North Africa and then Italy is too attractive, especially for Brits. Soviet Union can’t rely on Allied help, as a Russian proverb says: “Russia has two good allies: army and navy”. Therefore, only if the Red Army launches some great offensive with strategic goals ASAP and succeeds in this operation, USSR can be saved. In other case Germans will regroup, pour in fresh troops to the Ostheer, launch another “Fall Blau”-scale offensive in 1943 and possibly win by capturing Caucasian oil or Moscow. Red Army must do something with the danger, RIGHT NOW!
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